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CHJI..IF.MJI..N ELIHU M. HARRIS: This is the Assembly 
Judiciary Committee hearing on the subject of community property. 
Specifically, we will looking into the issues presented in 
Sullivan v. Sullivan. Our purpose today is to explore 
legislative so to the problem of dealing with so-called 
"career assets." At , career assets include the 
education, and obtained when one 
spouse puts the other spouse through school. In many cases, the 
marriage ends before the coromunity reaps the benefits from the 
financial investment made in the education or enhanced earning 
capacity. 
The issue before us 
be stributed between 
the division should be made 
is whether the career assets should 
ses upon divorce and, if so, hmv 
AB 525, 
earlier this 
a sal in re to Sullivan, was heard 
sent to interim study. whereupon was 
This hearing 
AB 525 but also other 2 
an opportunity to discuss not only 
and enhanced 
comments from s 
~he author of AB 525, As 
for ing with career assets 
s end, we've requested 
property and family law. 
with us, and I wou 1 ister at 
lyman Alister McAlister, is 
s point to open on the 
bill. 
ALISTER McALISTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
The reason a period of years of 
reflection, that I , over problems that arise from 
the basic exist dissolution laws, property 
distribution laws on occasion of ssolution, to women. No 
doubt, divorce i a ry event in most cases. Certainly, 
there are instances where men have ended up with disagreeable 
and, I suppose, even unfair results. Yet, in the vast majority 
of cases it is women suf r lly. This can be 
established by and s been established any number of 
statistical and scholarly studies that show within a few years of 
divorce, in any event usually at any period of time after the 
divorce, that the divorced woman and her children, who are 
usually given to her , are suffering whereas the 
divorced man is not, at least not lly, and at least not in 




support, are usual 
record, but the inadequacy 
these orders is 
these orders 
inadequate) were 
not enforced, not very 
both spousal support 
at all or to their amount 
quite low. In many cases, 
time, either as a matter of 
matter. 
and child 
ly a matter of 
The enforcement of 
scandal because, if 
start out 
But 're 
s rcentage of 
that are enforced 
orders is really 
ends after a period of 
or as a practical 
So what do AB 525 is my 
attempt to at least fully, accomplish 
something very lem. AB 525 
recognizes that, when a man a woman , they have made a 
commitment, that is not just, or even primarily, a romantic 
commitment but that is a soc , a human, and at bedrock an 
economic commitment. If it is not. all of those things, then one 
party or the other, the woman, dissolution is going 
to get it in the neck. f all of those things, then the 
weaker party, the economical party, upon dissolution is 
going to suffer, s. 
Now, the 
woman as a matter 
contributed 1 
regardless of the 
and the other not 




all aspects of 
media has been 
wi , works to put 
of professionaJ 
graduates and is 
divorce ensues. 
before the State 
guess the Court 
us what they're 
that my bill raises 
think it real makes a 
that, and I don't envy 
they've got one case be 
are strongly in 
unsatisfactorv to a 
to decide that one case 
precedent but 11, 
the area of law 11 real 
the man and the. 
passed, have 
they have contributed 
working outside the home 
mak far m0re money than 
ly contributed 
between themselves 
current sing that 
11 is ssed to 
licity in the 
spouse, usually the 
1 (through some kind 
the t that the husband 
good monPy, a 
Sullivan case pending 
, and I 
and tell 
it, because 
say the odds 
going to be very 
do. They've got 
some kind of 
a way that 
slature's 
job, it seems to me, to make the law and certainly to make the 
law in this field, and it's certainly our job to reflect the 
social consensus. It doesn't seem to me that we ought to rely on 
the Court to pull our chestnuts out of the fire in that respect. 
Now, I'm aware that in one respect this bill, or 
anything like it, is running against a certain tide in which it 
is represented that the sexes are now equal, that they are super, 
super equal and that therefore, if a marriage doesn't work out, 
that's just tough luck and they ought to both go their merry way 
without in any way depending on the other. I submit to those 
women who make that argument that they are making the argument 
that men's rights groups perhaps might make with some 
justification from the standpoint of their own self-interest, but 
it's not a very good argument for women to make. The facts are 
that, I don't care how far you take equalization, there will 
always be a substantial number of women who will decide right 
along with their husbands that they're going to devote most of 
their time to the home and that they will not go into the work 
force. 
I assume that we're not going to have a law to require 
everybody, male and female, to go out 100 percent into the work 
force and become truly economically equal. Unless that happens, 
\ve' re always going to have a large number of worren mostly who are 
going to suffer from what the traditional housewife suffers from 
when she is divorced, if she doesn't have the substantial means 
of going out into t.he world and supporting herself. You will 
have many other women who will work substantially for a period of 
years but who will not give the kind of undivided attention 
that the husband does, again largely because of family 
commitment. Then you \vill have those women who, doubtless, will 
take advantage of everything that your equality offers to them, 
\>lho will go out and become star lawyers, doctors, businesswomen 
a:r.c1 so forth. I submit, though, that the number of women in that 
category will probably never exceed, maybe, 20 to 30 percent who 
will really achieve that kind of equality. 
Certainly, there wil~ be large numbers of women who will 
never be on an equal basis from an economic standpoint. Now, in 
those cases where they are, of course, my bill isn't going to 
have much effect. If men and women are truly equal in a given 
marriage, then, of course, my bill doesn't have any effect at 
all. But it's ::or that much larger number where there really 
isn't that kind of equality that this bill and this concept are 
intended. Therefore, I think I've basically stated the 
foundation for my legislation, and I'll await with eagerness the 
comments, pro and con. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Thank you, Assemblyman 
McAlister. 
I would like also to introduce my colleagues, 
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in what she had helped him to generate not only by helping him 
financially through college but by taking over their jointly 
incurred responsibilities in the home, responsibilities that 
belonged equally to him, which had he taken over these himself he 
would not have been able to pursue his career full time ana 
continuously as he did. I would just like to read this last 
paragraph, if I may, Mr. Chairman. ,JoAnn writes: 
"I am angry over the hypocrisy of law that retro-
spectively denies the equality of my worth with 
that of my husband .... angry over [and I speak in 
terms of worth, not necessarily financial worth 
but worth to the family, to society, and to 
posterity, that her worth in the home was equal 
with his in these areas, with his work in his 
career field] having been placed in retro-
active indentured servitude to him for the 
duration of our marriage (and largely so for 
three years afterward) ..•• angry over having been 
forced into the position of a beggar in the courts .••. 
angry over the put-down implicit in the court's 
treatment of me under law that is supposed to treat 
the two parties to a divorce as having had equal 
dignity and worth throughout their marriage, with 
no fault charged to either party, but which has 
treated me as though I had been the culprit. And 
I am angry that millions of other women have 
been treated with the same kind of injustice 
in short, exploited." 
Patricia 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Thank you. The next witness will be 
rzog. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LLOYD CONNELLY: Elihu, could I ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Do you want to ask a question of 
the previous witness? 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: No, not a question to the 
previous witness but maybe a request to the witnesses who will be 
testifying. I could be wrong, and I don't know because I really 
haven't chatted with the members of thE~ Committee hear today. I 
think there is universal acceptance that the present system is 
inequi ta.ble and improper. I don't think there's any debate. I 
could be wrong among my Committee members. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You may be. I'm listening to what you 
have to say. 
ASSEMBLYM~N CONNELLY: There is improper consideration 
qiven to that now. There are four or five different ways to deal 
with tha.t. One is to allow the courts to consider the earning 
capaci t.y ar-quired in the determination of what spousal support 
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the ball of 
lf. 
Intangible property is not a new concept in our judicial 
interpretations. The Court has had to expand the definition of 
community property to try to undo some of the absolutely 
horrendous results of our Family Law Act, to divide the property 
evenly between the parties. This facially sounds like an 
equitable thing, but what has worked out to be -- and we all 
know this to be true and I think you have an excerpt from Lenore 
Weitzman's article in here, showing that it is not producing 
justice -- what it has resulted in is that, in the vast majority 
of divorces, the only community property very often is a family 
home which then has to be sold and the wife and the children are 
put out to try and find places that will rent to someone with 
children. It has not worked well. I think that one of the 
things that you miq.ht want to think about is adopting what many 
other states have adopted, namely equitable division. 
Actually, the McAlister bill -- I think it's well 
motivated. I think it has a snowball's chance in hell of 
passing, and I think it's probably unworkable. But I think that 
there are other methods of ameliorating the injustice of our 
present system. In arguing the case before the trial court here, 
after the preliminary hearing had eliminated any chance of our 
putting on evidence to show the value of the degree that Dr. 
Sullivan obtained, I argued that the court should use subsection 
nine of the spousal support section, which says "In determining 
spousal support •.• other equitable considerations"-- I think is 
the word that's used, but I'm not positive. I asked the court to 
award her spousal support based not on her need (at the time, she 
was earning twenty thousand dollars; Dr. Sullivan, who had just 
started his private practice was earning twenty-five thousand 
dollars) but on the basis of some sort of equitable 
consideration. The court turned me down. 
I then asked t.he court to reserve jurisdiction to award 
her some consideration in the future when Dr. Sullivan's practice 
ivould be more thoroughly established. I suggested to the court 
that it reserve jurisdiction so that she could come into court in 
a year or two or three and ask at that time for support so that 
she could go and get her professional degree. She needed an MBA 
because she was an economist, and she could really have used 
that. The court refused to do that. Now, if you're a practicing 
lawver you know that you cannot, if you are a spouse who is 
receiving support, you can't go into court later and say, "I want 
support because I've quit my job." If you're fired and you can't 
get a job, then you can get support, but you can't go into court 
and say, "I quit; now I want my ex-husband to support me." That 
doesn't fly. So I asked the court to make a reservation based on 
that particular set of facts and suggestions. The court couldn't 
and didn't do that. However, the Legislature, as I say, ccm do 
marvelous things. You're not bound by the same rules that the 
courts are. 
When I originally took this case (and here's another 
thought for you to throw around), I knew that Dr. Sullivan had 
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established his medical practice after separation. In our 
pleadings, we listed a community interest in the medical 
practice. My thinking at the time was that, even though the 
practice was established after they had separated and therefore 
was separate, his practice consisted of two component parts. A 
large component part was his energy and work, all of which after 
separation was separate, but there was a component in that 
practice which '\vas his education and training. In my own mind I 
thought, "Well, probably it would be just if 80 percent of his 
earnings were attributable to his separate effort and 20 percent 
to the education '\!Thich he received during the community. Then, 
if Janet were awarded 10 percent of his gross income for the same 
number of years that he was in school while they were marriPd, 
that would, in effect, be an equitable way of solving that. 
Well, of course, that runs into a number of prohibitions in terms 
of the judicial determination; however, it seems to me that is 
something you might think about. I believe that the Supreme 
Court is going to come in 'vi th some kind of a determination that 
an education is a form of intangible property. The economists 
call it "investment in human capital." It is an investment in 
human capital, and the people who invest in it are entitled to a 
return. 
Another way of looking at it is that professional 
education is work, and it's work when it is during the marriage. 
It's work performed during the marriage. It differs from 
employment in that the compensation for that work is deferred, 
and those of you who are domestic relations lawyers know that 
deferred compensation for work performed during a marriage is 
communit.y property and has been for some time in California. 
I think the Court's going to come in with a ruling that 
it's property. I'm not sure that that kind of a ruling, no 
matter how they structure the valuation problem, is going to do 
justice in every case. I'm only sure that the present system 
does injustice in practically every case. 
I think one of the other things that you should consider 
is that, when people invest in education, they expect a return 
from it. Therefore, if you have a longer marriage the nonstudent 
spouse, has received a return on that investment. Also, another 
thing to consider is that the value of the education is at its 
rtle>.ximum right after graduation. Your law school training, your 
medical training is most important. and most valuable right after 
you graduate, and, as you practice, the education is replaced by 
experience and good will in the value of your practice if you 
happen to be in private practice. 
CHAIIDA'..AN HAPRIS: I.et me interrupt you just one minute. 




and it's been very 
and involvement 
Let me a 
may have others. Number 
court in its decis 
other circumstances 
contributing spouse's s 
~ullivan. Wou co~~ent? 
case. 
1 to thank 
has been helpful, 
given your bar.kground 
sure my colleagues 
the appellate 
have been some 
value of the 
the education of Dr. 
MS No, 's not true. There were two 
decisions, o 
a una.nimous 
the Fourth Appellate. The first one was 
is 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm about the second one. 
MS. HERZOG: Yes, and the second one, two out of the 
three iudges said, "Oops! We made : it's not property of 
any kind." Ei ey 't read they signed the first 
time, or they didn't understand it, I don't know. I'm not here 
to explain what did. Both of se decisions, of course, 
are wiped out by of the case by the Supreme Court. 
Ru~ the decis out how to evaluate the 
degree ... I mean, the one. The second one just said that it 
wasn't property 't sell or transfer it, 
which is part of a o and one that already the 
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MS. HERZOG: Well, if your wife is staying horne ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, she's not. 
MS. HERZOG: Oh, I see. If she's working herself ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MS. HERZOG: On the other hand, if she is not employed, 
she is still making a contribution. That's what I'm saying to 
you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm sure she thinks she's making a 
contribution. I don't dispute that, but, in terms of giving 
anything up, I think she'd also tell you that she's not. She 
doesn't intend to either. (Laughter from audience) 
MS. HERZOG: I don't know your wife. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'd be happy to introduce you to her. 
MS. HERZOG: She's probably wise in not giving up 
anything. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't disagree. 
You mentioned an 80/20 split. How did you determine 
that 80/20 split? 
MS. HERZOG: It was just off the top of my head. There 
is no way to determine it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
varies from case to case. 
that what you're saying? 
In other words, you're saying that it 
It could be 20. It could be 30. Is 
MS. HERZOG: All I can say is that it struck me as a 
possible answer to the problem that always arises when you talk 
about determining thjs, an education, as property. I call it 
"the problem of the missionary doctor." You would think that 80 
percent of the doctors are going to be missionaries the way this 
comes up, but there is no doubt that some people after they get 
an education opt for nonrernunerative or not very remunerative 
positions. You might want to be an academic doctor in research. 
You might, instead of being an attorney in private practice or 
corporate practice, choose to be a legal. aid attorney. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask two other questions. 
MS. HERZOG: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: One, could you give me your 
perspective on why this couldn't be dealt with by a nuptial 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me give you an analogy. When we 
look for a legal secretary, we look for a racehorse in my law 
firm. I'm saying that we're looking for somebody who is going to 
outperform and outdistance the competition. Now, this is an 
analogy. We're not talking about people being inhuman or being 
like horses. We are talking about people who, in fact, are 
thoroughbreds, people who are superior, people who outclass the 
field. That was my analogy. 
Now, if you see a rising star, why would someone not 
say, "Look, that guy is going some place, and I'm going to help 
him so that I can ride his star to the future." With this bill, 
somebody's going to get a certain percentage of that person's 
future. In other words, if he were really a hard worker (a 
workaholic), he's going to work sixteen hours a day because he is 
that kind of a person. Somebody who may be married t.o that 
person three or four years is going to then have a continuing 
investment in that person. It's just like having a piece of your 
dreams. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: 11 r. Harris, could I make a point 
here? 
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: No, let me hear from the witness. 
Then I would certainly like to hear from someone else. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: I want to answer your question 
for her. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, but I asked her. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: What's wrong with investing in a 
racehorse? Aside from the moral problems that some might have in 
investing in things that are going to be used for gambling, 
what's wrong with investing in something that you think is going 
to pay off? If you invest in a racehorse and it does pay off, 
you've gotten money ck on your investment. Most of these 
divorced women haven't gotten anything on their investment. 
MS. HERZOG: The problem is that the racehorse can't 
walk away by itself but a husband certainly can. That's one of 
the problems of investing in human capital. If you buy a 
machine, the machine sits there and can 1 t go away until it breaks 
down and doPsn't run anymore. Investing in human capital, 
increasing the productivity of a human being, is a risky 
investment because the human being may die or, in this case, may 
walk away or take off. So I think that as to your idea, that 
what's wrong with investing in a person, there's nothing wrong in 
it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I didn't say it was wrong. I was 
asking what the difference was. 
-13-
MS. HERZOG: Well, the difference is that the horse is 
there for you to control, among other things. There are other 
differences, of course. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: All right. Are there any other 
questions? 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: As I understand, your bottom line 
would be a formula that considers the increased earning capacity 
in accordance with Alister's concept but takes 80 percent off the 
top, contributes that to personal initiative or skill ••. 
MS. HERZOG: Effort. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: .•• which, you know, takes 80 
percent of Alister's bill away, but then, second, places a cap in 
terms of the number of years equal to the time it tonk to receive 
the education. 
MS. HERZOG: Yes. Now, in Mr. McAlister's bill, he 
doesn't limit it to education. He talks about any increase in 
earning capacity. I think that, if you were going to apply that 
kind of formula, then you would have to put a cap on it in terms 
of years based on the nu~ber of years of the marriage if the 
increase is due to the work performed during the marriage. 
If I may just say one more word, I think a more 
realistic approach might be a formula to determine reasonable 
support based on the earnings of the two. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: So what you're saying is to get 
away •.. because can see some-- and Alister and I have 
graciously arm wrestled on it -- there's some enormous inequity 
potential under any formula because there are high-earning, 
short-education periods ... 
MS. HERZOG: Right. 
P..SSEMBLY~1AN CONNELLY: .•. long-education periods, low-
earnings, so forth and so on. But you would prefer then, just so 
I understand your testimony, that actually the breadth of area in 
which the trial court can rule involving spousal support would be 
expanded to equitable considerations, specifically, earning 
capacity acquired during the course of a marriage? 
MS. HERZOG: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: Something that simple and then 
leave Jt at that? 
Let me just respond and deal with the California Law 
Rev;i_sion Commission. As you knovl, they've already considered 
that. 
-14-
MS. HERZOG: Yes, Carol Bruch. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: They rejected that because of the 
absence of uniformity. Any problem in not having a formula is 
that in San Diego they that concept more restrictively or 
more generously Sacramento. How would you deal 
l;vith that? 
MS HERZOG: That s true and even in an individual 
jurisdiction, Orange County for example, some judges might go one 
way and some the other way That's always the problem, and I 
think that is one of the motivations behind the hard and fast 
rules that are in Family Law Act, that at the time that Act 
was passed, there was a substantial feeling that they couldn't 
trust the judges to be consistent, "so we aren't going to give 
them any discretion at all." I'm not sure that the cure isn't 
worse than the disease. It's very difficult for me to evaluate 
that particular problem. 
Let me say one other thing in regard •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: Let me say this so I can 
underst~nd what you're saying. What you're saying is that, on 
balance, you would take some disparity in how that concept of 
broadening spousal support was applied as opposed to some strict 
formula which would have some percentage .•. 
MS. HERZOG: 
that can do justice 
have some ability of 
sense of justice to 
I think there is a strict formula 
case, and I do think you have to 
the courts to use the common sense, their 
ust things. 
;._ssE~1BLYJII!..AN CONNELLY: Let me just get your comment on 
the Law Revision Commission's recommendation on the refund or t.he 
repayment the cost 
MS. HERZOG: 
ASSEMBLY~.A.N CONNELLY: 
Do you see s 
formula or problem? 
essentially their formula. 
lication of that 
MS. HERZOG: Well, I see potential inequities, yes, in 
any formula to determine value because of the i!ldividual 
situation of people. This formula is based on national 
statistics and that is on a statistical average 
may or may not f an individual case. I'm thinking about people 
who for one reason or another, the lawyer who in his last year of 
school has an automobile accident and can't talk anymore because 
he stutters too badly. There are always individual cases. There 
fl.re always individual situations. There is the Mormon who passes 
his medical exams and decides to do three years of volunteer 
work. Here we the doctor situation. I am not in 
favor of something res to go out and get the 
maximum earnings. 
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Another reason that I think that you ought to explore 
the spousal support end of it -- and I must say that other states 
have handled this problem with what they call "alimony in gross" 
that is, a lump sum figure, but it's also termed "alimony." 
The problem with a property division solution is that, 
particularly at the end of the schooling, the student is in a 
marvelous position to file bankruptcy and discharge that 
obligation. Spousal support, however, is not dischargable in 
bankruptcy so that is another consideration. I can see that, if 
the Supreme Court comes in with a formula based on the difference 
in earnings as the way to evaluate the doctor's degree, there's 
going to be a new course in how to get out of paying your wife 
anything for your degree. They're going to give that as a senior 
course, and they're going to teach them how to file their own 
bankruptcies. Mark Sullivan could have filed bankruptcy at that 
point. They had nothing. They had not accumulated in their ten 
years of marriage. They hadn't accumulated anything. So I think 
that that's a consideration too. 
Enforcement of spousal support is always difficult and, 
of course, enforcement of any debt is difficult, but I don't 
think that is within your ability to correct. I think that's 
just part of our society. Any other questions? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Did you have any questions, Mr. 
McAlister? 
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: Professor Bruch has suggested a 
somewhat different approach. Although she's b?sically 
sympathetic with what we're trying to do, she suggested an 
approach in which the relief would be called "lump sum spousal 
support," in an attempt to avoid the bankruptcy problem. 
MS. HERZOG: That is just what I said. 
ASSEHBLYMAN McALISTER: That is a serious problem that I 
think we no have to address because we certainly don't want 
someone to be able to wipe out all of his obligation by filing 
bankruptcy. 
There's a problem, though, that I think all the 
wi t.nesses, especially those who are dubious about my bill, really 
ought to address themselves to, and that is, and Ms. Herzog has 
stressed the need for, flexibility by the courts. Normally, I 
agree with that, except that here we have a pattern of fifty or a 
hundred or two hundred or however many years of divorce law in 
which that ~J.exibility has led to, in 80 percent of the cases or 
more, women getting it in the neck, '~i th snpport orders that are 
inadequate and with support enforcement procedures that are 
tragic. Now, what gu~rantee do we have with this, in concept, 
beautiful idea of flexibility is going to work any better in the 
future with any new scheme than it's worked in the past? 
-lfi-
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ever. smr,e vers of ~lurphy s La.w. 
What makes us 
flexibility 
in the past it 
idea of guarantee. 
to work this 
the past, where 
MS. HERZOG: I are some protections still 
available in the Fami stantial, equal division 
and so forth and so on , possib , if the court 
could work out a form for spousal support and child 
support, it wou as much to re the problems of women and 
children in this state as anything they could do. 
A of both parties 
and then sian that would be more equitable 
than "How much s woman need to survive?" would be 
an enormous assistance to people. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HcALISTER: Some of the counties, I 
















lot of emot 
you know the 
of a suggested schedule. 
the state, and those are only 
anywhere. I think that even a 
somebody can determine that, if 
're the shaft. 
7 
in Orange County, 
Does County have such a 
have such a 
don't practice in San 
Do practice in any counties 
Orange County. 
because there are a 
st to practice where 
CHlURMAN HARRIS: As a matter of fact, we are working in 
that vein, trying to come up with some kind of statewide 
standard. You might take a look at Assemblyman Art Agnes's bill 
[AB 1527] • 
MS. HERZOG: I think that would be very helpful so that 
you could know. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We're using Santa Clara County's 
standard as a guide in the legislation that we're pursuing at 
this point. Assemblyman Agnes's bill is currently alive. I 
don't know how well it is doing. 
MS. HERZOG: I'm not familiar with those standards. 
Whether I would think they were adequate, I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You may want to look at it. We're 
also looking into automatic cost of living adjustments too so 
there're a lot of things that we're trying to do to make some 
changes. This is one of them. 
MS. HERZOG: I think cost of living adjustments would 
also help a lot. It would keep people from having to go back 
into court and take the court's time and spend their money in 
that regard. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's right. Thank you very much. 
Your testimony has been more than helpful. Thank you. 
MS. HERZOG: Thank you. 
MS. ELWELL: Mr. Chairman, could I ask her one question? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No. You can talk to her outside 
though. When you get in the r,egislature, you can sit up here 
like us and act crazy. (Laughter) 
The next witness will be Mr. Fred Hiestand. 
MR. FRED J. HIESTAND: Thank you, Mr. Harris and members 
of the Committee. It's always a pleasure to come to San Diego. 
I originally became involved with this problem on behalf 
of the California Medical Association, which asked that I do an 
amicus brief, the thrust of which was to say to the Court, "You 
should not try to repair this inequity because bad cases make for 
bad law, or hard cases make for bad law, but instead you should 
leave it for the Legislature to do so." Then Mr. McAlister 
responded with his bill, and you're apparently considering doing 
so. I don't really know how much I have to say that isn't 
already adequately given to you by your consultant in the 
analysis in terms of raising questions. 
-18-
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But the examples 
that have been used, especially in the briefing on this case by 
the parties that would have the court put a value on it, I 
suggest argue as much for not putting a value on it. The 
examples that are used are that, for instance, we place values on 
pain and suffering. 
This Cmnmittee knows, from s consideration of bills in 
the tort reform area over the past few years, what that has led 
to. It has led to what Justice Roger Traynor said twenty-five 
years ago in his dissent in the Seffert case was a situation that 
we could not tolerate for long because we would be trying to 
spread the loss through the cost of goods and services in a way 
that all of us could ill afford after a time. Pain and suffering 
is quite subjective and, as this Committee knows, it was so 
subjective during the medical malpractice crisis that the 
Legislature decided to cap it at $250,000; that's all the pain 
and suffering that they thought a person was worth getting 
compensat.ed for in medical malpractice. 
One other time in the history of civil legislation, the 
Legislature decided in defamation actions (when you're suing a 
broadcaster or publisher), if there's an opportunity for 
retraction that is given that there can be no pain and suffering 
damages, no noneconomic losses whatsoever recovered. So that 
again shows that there has been recognition that pain and 
suffering is not something that you should necessarily try to 
place a value on in all situations. 
In the case of Turpin (the wrongful life case) , where a 
baby was horn defective and they felt tha~ the doctor, by not 
giving adequate information to the pnrents that would have 
resulted in perhaps an abortion that would have saved the child 
from having those defects, should pay damages for the rest of 
that child's life, the California Supreme Court itself said, 
"Medical care, yes; but pain and suffering, no. We have to draw 
the line somewhere." If and suffering is to be used as an 
example for how you can put a value on a medical education or 
legal education or whatever, I suggest it argues as much the 
other way as it does for placing a value on it. 
Unvest.ed contingent ion rights was another example 
of something that the Cali a courts have placed a value on. 
It's argued that therefore we can place a value on the medical 
degree by analogy. But precise se the California courts 
have done that, the courts of other states v1here they have not 
done that have reached instead to the medical and legal degrees. 
I suggest that they done so because they have already ruled 
that they are not goina to place a value on the unvested 
con~ingent pension benefits. So, ng eliminated that as one 
of the sources of cornmuni ty they might divide, they have 
then looked over to thi s as a ical and a legal degree, 
and then that's cited as precedent for California as to why we 
should move over that same direction also. 
-20-
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ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER common o prejudice, sir. 
MR. HIESTAND: . . to extent these were divorces 
with ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: If statistics mean anything to 
you, and that anybody seriously questions 
the main so 's survey, those 
male complaints are mo f Now there, of course, 
will be individual s could be justified. I 
think what happens, female, in many divorces 
it's a very bitter thing. Of course, regardless, whether a law 
is no-fault or not, in human relations we tend to stress fault, 
and if one thinks because of the fault of 
the other spouse, s to think the other 
spouse should 
MR. HIESTAND: Yes, e was supposed to be 
eliminated with the enactment of no-fault divorce. 
most men, even 










Yes, I know it, but that's why 
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't want to 
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ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: A 1 , half 1 
MR. HIESTAND: It's just that 
property, I think le 1 that community 
the eaual division are pretty le. 
have community property, 's le. 
disaster. you're in a 
property, it's an economic saster, 
to that marriage has some ability, whether 
education or natural ability, they will 
better than the other. 
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s without 
ASSEMBLY.f;I!J\N McALISTER: Our major , though, goes 
back to our definition of what is property. The major asset that 
most people is not ten million dollars of Oil 
stock. It is earning capacity of one or both of the spouses. 
That's thP major asset that most people have. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
about that, Mr. McAlister. 
before. 
I don't think there's question 
You reduced it to that argument 
Mr. Hiestand, do you have anything else 
like to add? 





(To Assemblyman Connel ) : Do you have 
any que 
All , Mr. Connelly has no que 
Mr. Hiestand, thank you. 
MR. HIESTAND: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We appreciate 
Kathleen Eggleston. 
MS. KATHLEEN A. EGGLESTON: 
statement that I will submit for the 
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I think, first of all, the way 
is fair the sense that it looks at 
marriage. Let me just put it to you 
the same. I mean, whether it's 
footrace, it's racehorses, 
equal. So 's wrong to 
of "Here are two people coming into a 
so. 
people leave the marriage what we want to do i 
They weren't 1 to begin with. So what you 
the law is concerned, you go into the 
adults. You make your bargain~ in the 
(that is within marital privacy), 
process that goes on between those two 
s Legislature cannot enact any 
legislation that is going to hedge a bet on 
deals. Some guys makes foolish deals. We al 
McAlister always talking about women I t 
but just enrages me because it that as 
a behind eight ball and I'll 
neck. I 't bel that. But 1 for those 
can't make those rules, there are always 
bargains. 
I think that if I came to you and 
market, and I really thought that if 
thousand dollars, I was going to make some 
because I want you to pass a bill that 
money and my time and my energy and if I 
because of my expectation, E. F. Hut:ton 
we're in a s on now that 
public policy demand some 
that people should just 
r-1S. EGGLESTON: irman 
a hard cold approach and the reason is 
I'm not standing here as a hard cold woman, a 
career and the whole t. There was a 
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MS. EGGLESTON: Mr. McAlister, 
to you. I am not synonymous, because of my 
word "family." A family takes two people. 
it takes a wi and it takes two 
child's best interests. Now, what that means 
we're talking about are not spousal 
he gets me. What we're talking about is, 
"little daddy," getting some of the "big 
structural changes \'lhich don't a.llow me as a 
more than two hundred dollars in an IRA or, for 
start a Keogh. Yet, you say that all of the 
a homemaker are so valuab Then can t I 
self-employed? You see, these are structural 
something 
, with the 
to put 
, I can't 
I do as 
you're 
talking about, doing some very heavy shi 
to get it out of his pocket and tie my 
s much easier 
as a woman to him 
as a man. 
ASSE:f-1BLYMAN McALISTER: You haven 1 t eve:r. an attempt 
to answer my question, so let me ask you another stion. How 
long do you think these structural changes are go ng to take? 
MS. EGGLESTON: I don't have the vaguest 
as long as it will take to get some husbands to 
their lives to women. 
ASSEMBLY~illN McALISTER: You expect 
happen in the lives of anyone in this room? 
Probably 
half of 
s going to 
MS. EGGLESTON: I'm not being fair, I shouldn't do that. 
I'm sorry. I will go back and try to answer stion. 
If certain structural changes are may be that 
we are not talking about the roles of just a woman ing after 
the children. It may be that men are It may , 
if a man knew that he would not be pena s job, we may 
be close to a situation of sharing parenting, just l talked 
about joint custody. But, as it is right now, look 
at the women and the children. 
The whole concept of the "tender 
women getting the children -- in Victorian 
never awarded the ldren. This was on 
the children out of the labor market. There was 
man had the right to s children, and if 
she maybe went back to her mother, but he 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: This is 
heard an alleged feminist extolling Victorian 
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This variation of earning capacity, rather than taking just one 
part of it and legislating to deal with that, the part that's 
easiestly quantifiable really ought to of a 
equitable evaluation. 
Alister's formula is, I think, We veta 
about that and arm wrestl He hasn't me 
haven't persuaded him. Something bothers me about this 
little piece of it when that ought to be a piece considered a 
part of the whole in terms of this earning capacity ation. 
MR. STERLING: Yes, I understand what you're saying. 
Basically, the Cormnission felt, as you said, this was an easy one 
to address that could be cured. Let's do now, and worry 
about the rest later. 
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: Nat, do I understand the 
Commission's proposal is for the wife to be compensated? There 
is the underlying assumption that she has worked and contributed 
some money or somethinq of that kind, right? 
MR. STERLING: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Now, what about the fe who 
hasn't worked. I mean, does she owe the husband money then? 
MR. STERLING: No. The concept is, i.f there have been 
community assets that have been contributed to one spouse's 
education, the community gets reimbur so sn't matter 
where that cornmuni ty property came from. It could be from the 
wife's earnings. That's the typical case we're thinking of, but 
it could be from the husband's earnings too. Who knows where the 
community assets have come from? But fact is t.he 
has been depleted for the benefit of one spouse and 
proper to have the co~munity be reimbur for that 
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: Well, take the case re the 
wife did not work out of the home. She stayed in the home, took 
care of the children, did whatever she did. The husband went to 
school and got an education. Does your bill apply to that 
situation? 
MR. STERLING: Yes. 
ASSEMBLY~..AN McALISTER: What will hc,ppen? What will 
your bill cause to happen? 
I-1.R. STERLING: 
situation? 
There are no community aBsets that 
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: Take a case, I guess, kind of 
like the Sullivan case, where there's litt of what we call, at 
least in the traditional sense, "community assets"... re the 















it can lp but be 
see -- we're not sure 
ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: Would you mind telling me just 
how you think you're going to live with this? Say, the Supreme 
Court renders the relief that Mrs. Sullivan is asking for. 
MR. HUNTINGTON: If they do, we' live with it. We'll 
have to. We don't have much of an option. I don't get to 
testify in front of the Supreme Court. I do here. 
ASSEMBLY~.AN McALISTER: Yes. But I assume that yon feel 
that their decision in favor of her would be a disaster on a par 
with the passage of this bill? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: I hope they don' t come down ~·lith a 
decision that goes in that direction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: No one knows \vhat they' 11 I 
just wondered. 
MR. HUNTINGTON: They've had it for close to a year now 
so they may never come down with the decision. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: I guess that your testimony kind 
of reflects -- to sum up your testimony, your letter states, "On 
balance there is no wide spread evil, either real or perceived, 
that needs a cure. You're using a bazooka to kill a gnat. The 
evil perceived is that on occasion a doctor or lawyer obtains an 
education at the expense of his or her spouse." [Appendix D) I 
~!lender, have you read Lenore Weitzman's study? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: I've never heard of Lenore Weitzman. 
ASSEMBLY~.AN McALISTER: You've never heard of her? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Well, your testimony certainly 
reflects your ignorance. 
MR. HUNTINGTON: Sir, I doubt if Lenore Weitzman's ever 
read any of my articles either. (Laughter) 
ASSEt1BLY:t4AN McALISTER: What have your articles 
about? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: Tax law, divorce tax law, divorce 
taxation, valuation of community assets in a divorce case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Have they dealt with the 
economic plight that the wife faces on divorce? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: I have never written anything on that 
specific subject. I've lectured for the University of 
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concerns about AB 525 as practicing attorneys are, 
enormous cost to the cl s and an enormous cost 
itse f. We have a dissolution time study 
you. You wanted s earlier. There's a 
that shows the extra costs that we now have 
o~ us not only by the Sullivan legislation 
that may come down but also by our local 
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often are unnecessary, to go through 
that don't matter to you people here. 
thirteen hours of additional lawyer 
hundred dollars to two hundred dol 
These add enormous costs to clients, 
benefit. I will guarantee ~hat you 
hire expert witnesses on both sides. You 
have hired guns on both sides, and you're 
it virtually in any kind of a case you 
lavryer, after Smith v. Lewis came down ten 
right mind would try a ~ase without 
as to some theoretical enhancement 
I think the thing that 1 
my letter is the fact of my own 
roughly twenty-one years. We started out 
wife through her last year in college. 
She's never cooked professionally since 
me through three years of law school whi she was a 
for the welfare department in San Francisco. 
apartment house manager and learned how to 
apartment house manager. Then she 
master's degree in tax law. I supported 
master's degree in social work. I've gone 
seventy-five CEB seminars, and if you can sort 
this bill, more power to you, but I think 
expert witnesses will be the ones that 
only limit2tion on this bill is the 
lawyer. 
The fact is San Diego, 
are tried under what we call a " 
or less. If you have a three-hour-or-
trjal and resolve your case for the 
inside of five months. If you expand 
is roughly four to five hours of trial 
at ten months to trial. If you throw 
of this, then you're going to a two day 
roughly twenty months to trial, and we 
fastest counties in the state of Cali 
Angeles, I suspect you're talking 
throw the Sullivan testimony on top of 
The system down here is working. It 
tuned. Why overwhelm it? 
ASSEr-1BLYMAN McALISTER: I'm just 
t.Pstimony I'm hearing from lawyers here 
the last statement this gentleman made 
£.ystem here is working. Why fool with 
If the lawyers of our state or their 
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and we don't" 
even, coming 
problems." I 
myself. "But we 
re that. needs to 
in our system, tragic 





ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Then 
your fel are 
to what is happening to and 
women throughout this 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Conne 
re dealing th the 
real world is 
it's all right 
lawyers here 
bill has real 
's got problems 
found difficulty 
are terrible defects 
t. 
our Committees to 
s," but I haven't 
defects that you 
just say that you and 
world in respect 




Huntington, could you comment 
f equitable finition or 
consid;::;r at 
during the rna 
idea? 
MR If I 
4801 seems ss most of 
around nine suhsect s 
aspects of earning capac 
i sues 
allov-1 con 
, status of 
a whole numb~~r of s 
deal with the lem 
.l>,SSEMBLY:t-1AN CONNELLY: 
assigning a need that's used, 
the equation. It's the of 
some other of the folks have te 
that have been written on the subject 
to be a specific not 
but in considering J 
consideration earning capacity 
of the marriage. 
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sal support to 
on acquired skills 
idea or a bad 
question, Section 
already. It has 
of a variety of 
ing, capacity to earn, 
that doesn't already 
under concept of 
re's the other part of 
Ms. Herzog and 
some of the articles 
say that there ought 
relying upon need 
1 that takes into 
red during the course 
MR. HUNTINGTON: My understanding of Section 4801 is 
that capacity to earn and standard of living kind of go hand in 
hand and already exist. In a situation where you have a 
nonworking wife and a substantially ~arning husband, that's going 
to be taken care of by the concept of alimony. What if she 
remarries, then alimony terminates and it sn't on 
like this hill seemingly does. I think the concept of alimony 
addresses the problem. 
ASSEMBLY~~N CONNELLY: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are you from San Diego? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: Yes, sir. 
CHAI~!AN HARRIS: Do you live ~'.s. Mojonn.ier's 
C.istrict? 
MR. HUNTINGTON: No, I don't believe so. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Oh, it seems like you two went to the 
same school. (Laughter) 
HR.HUNTINGTON: We studied under the same master. 
CHAIP~N HARRIS: I see. Well, I'm looking forward to 
when you and Ms. Eggleston find an issue that you disagree on. 
Wr~ \·lant to have a stimulating debate. We' 11 come back to San 
Diego for it. (Laughter) 
MR.HUNTINGTON: I enjoyed her testimony. 
CHAIRP~N HARRIS~ Yes, and I enjoyed yours. Thank you. 
MR.HUNTINGTON: Thank you. 
CHJl.~IRMAN HARRIS (To the Co:ro.mi ttee) : Anybody else have 
0.ny questionn? 
Our next witness will be Mr. Andrew Wagner. Mr. Wagner, 
welcome. Would you introduce yourself and who you represent? 
HP. ANDREW G. WAGNER: Thank you. My name is Andrew 
Wagner, I'm the [in~coming] Chairman of the Family Law 
Specialists Advisory Committee of the San Diego County Bar 
Association. I'm also an adjunct professor of family law and 
have been for the past fifteen years. I'm here, first, to give 
the opinior. of the family law specic;_lists as to this particular 
bill. We oppose it. 
I find myself standing in splendid isolation with all 
the other lawyers who have spoken today ... 
CHAI~.N HARRIS: ~1r. McAlister's going to love you. 
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ASSEMBLY~~N McALISTER: I 
to say. (Laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: He 
MR. WAGNER: 
the lawyers have said; 
I might want to add to it. 





A lawyer who is actually an intel 
his field! 
l\fR. WAGNER: 
to what he's going 
(Laughter) 
rtually everything 
of additions that 
other people, I 
've referred to. 
le! (Laughter) 
bothers to study 
with 
in 1977 them. (Laughter) . I cons 
have little or no application 
is a random sa.rople of court. 
variations that enter into any 
Therefore, I question them. 
I cons r a study which 
to he not indicative of the 
disso ion proceedings. 
ASSEMBLY¥illN McALISTER: What's happened in six years to 
make a difference? 
HR. WAGNER: I would commend to Co:mmi t tee two cases: 
Brown v. Brown and another case called Brantner, written by a 
judge by the name of Gardner in the Fourth District. 
I think, more than case that I've ever 
read in my whole li , the Brantner case brings succinctly to 
focus what is the sublimina ssue of s going on today, and 
that is the discussion of discarded Judge Gardner in very 
poetic language describes them as " mares" who after their 
fecundity are put out to pasture. In doing so, he is discussing 
the very issue that you've raised called "spou support," and I 
commend it to you. I commend it to because 's an 
indicatioc of enlightened reasoning and it's also an indication 
of how creatively spousal support can used. 
I also recommend that the people 
which is the spousal support code section 
with great care. Because sl 
fulfill the exact desires that, I bel 
to have fulfilled. 
here read Section 4801, 
and that they read it 
cation, it can 
, this Committee wishes 
It is my opinion and it is the opinion of my committee 
thilt to create a species of property that is dependent upon two 
rather ephemeral concepts is to create a situation which will 
guarantee that lawyers become richPr and litigants become poorer. 
It will alsc guarantee that we will create, as Ned pointed out, 
new experts. It will also enhance the income of accountants, 
economists, actuaries, physicians (because I think we have to 
make determinations about the health of the people in order to 
qualify the amount that we're talking about). And certainly 
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we'll have psychiatrists who will come 
psychiatric impact of this whole 
economic advantage, I 'ltle all 
litigants. 
There were i 
which I attempted to answer. 
that I had attended the wrong 
posed were, number one, should career 
property? No. I took upon lf 
was to look up the two words in 
"A field for or pursuit of 
especially, in public, professional, 
Secondary definition: "A profession 
"Asset": "The entire property of all 
to the payment of his debts." 
"Career asset" is an 
It is also a question as to what we 
the concept in legislation. What 
actually do use this term, what 
include any training that occurs 
any advancement cue to activity or e 
longevity? If so, what limits do we app 
limit that which is ~egitimate training out 
category of the particular employee? How 
input do we use? To use the old 
computers, "garbage 
Bill, scholarships, 
part-time work? Are 
upon them because of the other's 
consideration that should be used? 
I've heard people talk about 
concepts that deal with intangib 
rights, and the other, good will. 
comparison at all. Good 11 is a 
concept that has been in existence 
The fact that good will is applied to 
divorce is indicative of the flexibil 
so far as defining community property 
professionals, particularly lawyers, 
salable co~~odity. I, again, 1 that 
characterize it as property and we 
characterize it as cow~unity property. 
I think part of the confus 
we quite frequently use the word 
saying "standing to sue" because we 
only those people who have property 
a law suit, as opposed to those 
inchoate, unvested, or expectanc 
use not only those labels, but we 




it does not go 
does not mean I 
inequity, because I feel 
inequity can be reso 
Section 4801. I 
door this state into 
"equitable distribution state." 
we determined that we would 
state. If we now feel that 
approaching things, I 
instead of trying to 
distinguish, if not 
LaBtly, if 
perceive any relevancy 
property only because 
property, or isn't 
children, in my limited 
of what is property or 
Specific sugge s 
that subsection one of Section 
amended by language which 
as it presently reads is " 
taking into account the extent 
present and future 
unemployment that were 
supported spouse to devote 
could be added, or a comma 
as this, but not neces 
of the other spouse." 
Subsection s 
spouse to acquire appropriate 
employment." If I under 
ensure t~at one person does not 
while the other suffers, and I 
specifically devoted to that 
Subsection e 
has already been addressed 
power to do anything 
factors which it deems just and 
expanded to define i cal 
under the circumstances. 
Lastly, 
the court has the power to award a 
to compensate the pa for 
need. Subsection {b) ta 
terminability of spousal 










made are, I think, 





to permit the 
A sentence 




11, it is to 
and education 
of the parties, 
the court the 
, "Any other 
That section can be 
just and equitable 
to indicate that 
alimony in gross 
to be this 
fiablility and 
ili of parties in 
I suggest that, if we are really to ust 
this situation, that an amendment of that, giving the power of 
the court in this limited arena to create a f 
nonterminable support to compensate for would an 
equitable way of proceeding. It's es s set 
forth in the letter provided you by 
escapes me at the very moment. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Professor Bruch 
IY!R. WAGNER: Thank you . Last 1 y ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: I think she 
beyond that. You're a moving in the right 




~1F.. WAGNER: I agree she does. I m not sure I want to 
of alimony go as far as she does, but I do agree with the 
in gross. 
I think the concept of whether or 
deductible or tax includable is a question 
make a determination. Are we dealing 
dealing with support? The difference between 
very hard to distinguish. 
should be tax 
">ve have to 
, or are we 
the two is often 
Lastly, I can only make this other 
C0mmittee. It is virtually the unanimous 
law certified specialists of San Diego 
passed. It is also our recommendation 
consider modifications of Section 4801, 
suggested, but perhaps as the way to 
statement to the 
you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you 
question, Mr. Connelly? 
ASSEMBLY~~N CONNELLY: Yes, sir. 
(To Mr. Wagner) You had indicated 
the Law Revision Co:mmission' s recommendat 
altereo. I wondered what alteration 
propose in that? 
Do 





Commission didn't go far enough. Their recommendation simply is 
a statement in which they are saying that should be 
reimbursed for monies paid out. I think only 
addresses the problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: So your is the 
Section 4801 expansion that you've identif wou be an 
addition to the Law Revision Commission's recomiDendation? 
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!v!R. WAGNER 
do that, we must delete 
separate property of 
CHAIR.tvl.A,N HARRIS: 
McAlister, do you have 
ng to 
s loans the 
11. Mr. 
Are there very 
much, Mr. Wagner. You 
.A.ll right, 
Diego chapter c:f NOW. 
MS. LENORE LOWE: 
represent San Diego 
members of the Cali a 
would like to thank all o 
I feel that ce 
this 
It's intere 
on the list that, I 
hand, you have the 
On the other hand, all 
looking at our watches 
spent here debating an 
enough to qo on for 
~'\hat I fcm 
the women who are 
is passed have been 
mares," have also 
the cleaners,"and have 
meal ticket." I don't 
women who would be af 
if I did I would 
qualifications about 
We've also 
that there is a prob 
seemed to me some confus 
there was a problem. 
bazooka gun at a gnat 
this body needs to be 
audience who may think 
three adults living in 
that, by all projections, 
nearly 100 percent of 
be women and their ch 
remainr~ that we 
By the State 
study by the chair of 
Vasconcellos, the s 
San 
and I not only 
sand 
I 
near the last. 














erms was "a 
ffect. I think that 
those in the 
that two out of 
are women and 
ll find that 
level will 
there, the fact 
outlined in a 
Committee, John 
decreases by 
73 percent for a woman. The standard 
increases by 42 percent after divorce 
have a lot at stake here if in fact we 
"career assets." I think 
heard from many men and also 
that we shouldn't enact 
lose, I wouldn't want this 
Many factors contribute to 
there are two major factors that we 
divorce. It skews this picture, as 
Legislature's own sturly. Women who 
and their career development in order 
community find themselves in an 
Not all women have opterl to do tha~ or 
whatever you might call ~-1any women 
were forced into that role because of 
We know that when a man divorces he 
often when a woman divorces she become 
is faced with a unique need to 
for her children because we also know that 
awarded in 40 percent of the cases 
v1here it is awarded it's less than two 
We also know that alimony is only 
the cases, and there's some speculation 
that 15 percent is. 
The second major factor 
women is our earning potential. 
women earn only fifty-nine cents on 
earned by men. But what you might 
earn on an average only ten thousand 
men earn twenty-five thousanc1 dollars 
woman with a college education will not 
time as a man with an eighth grade 
economic inequities that are 
must address. 
ASSEMBLY~~N CONNELLY: Ms. Lowe 
specific legislative recommendations that 
MS. LOWE: I'll be brief. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CONNELLY: Thank 
.MS. LOWE: 
85 percent of the women in this 
end up supporting themselves, and I 
that. We did speak about all of these 
into the labor market and doing these 
I would point out to you that Assemb 
of two women to go to the State Assemb 
San Diego. The gains that we're making 
until such time that women can support 
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children above the poverty level, which a moderate income would 
be twenty-five thousand dollars a year, which puts women fifteen 
thousand dollars under that level, we do need to reach some 
agreement in how to provide for these women. 
CHlURMAN HARRIS: Let me to 
testimony. Are you in favor of A.B 525 as 
MS. LOWE: We are concerned about AB 525 as written for 
a number of reasons that have also been described here today. 
For example, we are not clear on vvhy s would apply only to 
people who have children. We also feel that Professor Bruch has 
taken a great deal of energy and time to put forth something that 
may be more workable and certainly more passable in the State 
Legislature. 
I think at the bottom of all of this is that we must 
reach a compromise behveen what is here as written and what 
Professor Bruch and others have put forth because, if we don't, 
we're going to continue to displace people into poverty, but most 
of those people are women. The dissolution of a partnership must 
not be allowed to place either spouse in poverty while the other 
continuPs to benefit and flourish from career assets or earning 
potential established in the partnership wi_ a community. 
I'm sure that the women that were here today would tell 
you that what they put in in terms of caring for their children, 
in terms of making it easier for one spouse to work in the job 
market, must be compensated. I know as well as of you that, 
if we all had a wife at home, we would be able to go just that 
much fa~ther because someone has to do the laundry and someone 
has to raise the kids and someone has to prepare the meals. I 
think that it's about time that we recognize that women largely, 
or the spouse that is the homemaker, must be compensated 
equi ta.bly. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you to ask a few 
questions. First of all, I guess to some extent going back to 
Ms. Eggleston's argument, there are obviously changes in 
society ... 
MS. LOWE: Certainly. 
CHAIRrvlAN HARRIS: ... and women's roles are changing, I 
think, purposP.fully so that they do not. simply want to be 
homemakers who will be waiting at home to wash the clothes and 
nurse the children. Obviously, there're more and more working 
women and more and more families where both parents Are in fact 
working. 
We're talking about putting into the law a change by 
virtue of AB 525 that is going to be theoretically into 
perpetuity. We're changing public policy to indicate that, in 
fact any spouse, whether it's male or female, should be benefited 
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by the contribution, made to the other se 
of a marriage as it relates to future earnings. 
concerned with the total impact that this is 
course 
So v.1e ' re rea 
to have Is 
it going to be fair to both spouses, and is 
in the long run and not just to deal with some 
or a minority of cases that may be just of 
sensibilities? 
~IS. LO'VJE: I think, when two-thi 
women, it's not a minority of the cases. 
to look at ••. 
CHAI~iAN HARRIS: No, I'm talking 
the cases as it relates to spousal support a 
future earnings. 
to 
MS. LOWE: Okay, but if you talk 
-- I mean -- if women are only making on an 
thousand dollars a year, average, their li is 
less than the men so ••• 
CHAIR}1AN HARRIS: I understand 
out of a marriage. 
, but 's or 
MS. LOWE: Yes, it is, but what I'm is 
when you're addressing something like this 
need to look at is simply the earnings. If 
earnings are substantially more than the 's 
perhaps that should apply to her. In most cases, 
happen. I think what we need to look at as I 
compromise, perhaps on the basis of Professor 
that we don't run into the same kinds of 
some difficulty with termination of a marr 
dissolution of a marriage. We need to 
things, but in reality it's not a few cases. 
CHAIR}1AN HARRIS: No, I'm saying a case 
MS. LOWE: \\fe' re talking about most 'l.vomen 
substandard levels. 
CHAI~AN HARRIS: Let me make sure 
I'm saying. I'm saying a few cases that 
sensibilities. There are some cases anyone would say, 
"Look, that's just not right." This woman or this man 
sacrificed, went through all of these changes, and then as a 
result of the one spouse who is just, as Mr ister 
a scoundrel •.. 
MS. LOWE: But I don't see how that can 
in only 15 percent of all dissolutions re's an awa 
alimony anyway. We're not talking about all of 
out and getting a divorce and 100 percent or 90 







women collecting alimony is even less than that. It's not even 
at a liveable wage or even a wage so that they can get 
retraining. 
Everything aside was today, the is 
that women are ~uffering because it's women are in the 
inferior economic position, anc we have to do something about 
that ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand ••. 
MS. LOWE: ••• and, reach a compromise in legislation. 
CHAIRlv1AN HARRIS: 
comments? Any questions? 
All right. Thank you. 
~'lr. McAlister? 
Any other 
ASSEMBLYMAN McA.LISTER: No, I don 1 t have any stions. 
(To Ms. Lowe) Thank you for your fine testimony. 
CHAIR~~N HARRIS: AJl right. There are two witnesses 
who will not be here. One is Mr. Morris Sorenson, an attorney, 
who was not able to be here because of a conflict. He is Dr. 
Sullivan's attorney. The other is the representative from the 
T:lomen Lawyers 1 Association of Los Angeles who had also intended 
to testify but will not be present. 
Now, we will accept very brief testimony from the 
audience, anyone who would like to ado to the record. If you 
would like to make extended remarks, we will in fact receive 
those for the review of the Committee and for the preparation of 
the transcript of the hearing. I don't have any prescribed 
order, but if people will be courteous we wi.ll attempt to hear 
all of them. I don't anticipate it to be more than two or three. 
We do not want to hear anyone who has already testified. If you 
h~ve questions or if you have additional information that you 
would like to submit, we can extend the remarks that were made 
orally earlier during the testimony. We will hear any witness 
from the audience who would like to testify. 
Introduce yourself for the record, ane, if you're 
representing an organization, also state that. 
MS. HEATHER SAVILLE-HYDE: Mr. Chairman and members of 
the Committee, I'm Heather Saville-Hyde, a recently divorced 
homemaker. 
What I find interesting is that we are so poorly 
represented here, that we have heard, virtually no evidence at 
all from divorced women. I was divorced after a thirty year 
marriage, and I'm here to present a case for AB 525. I would 
like to see this Cormnittee hear the testimony from more divorced 
women before they make their determination. 
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The pressure on government resources of feminization 
of poverty has at last forced an awareness of the appalling 
financial plight of women and children n 
Different groups have offered different 
Legal groups have recommended marriage 
spousal support. Grass roots groups I 
should like to deal briefly with all 
I would like to start with marriage contracts. is 
certainly a place for marriage contracts or during 
marriage, where a man or woman perce s c 1 or other 
circumstances which dictate special protection or where the 
intentions of career partners create a 1 need. But more 
marriage contracts are not the Measure masses whom 
general blanket protection must be 
For most roarrying couples, 
represent an unnecessary expense at a jll 
aftord it, when they are young with minimal l resources 
already being tapped to the hilt. Marriage contracts are a 
device that the young are not experienced enough to handle. With 
marriage needs and priorities not yet establi , indeed, 
exposure to the world at large scarce couples 
would be ill equipped to judge where, whom 
protection was needed. With the aura 
theM at this time, they might make poor 
omission. The less experienced might 
Marriage contracts at the outset o 
emotionally disturbing. The very 
odds with the sense of commitment to an 
that most marrying couples start with. 
contracts will probably not be entered 
Let us not overlook that marr 
business venture. It's an emotional 
Without protective law, the bulk of women 




s reason, marriage 
as 
is 
contracts to be 
cost to each tigant and 
nightmare at the end when, instead of one 
established, there will be a myriad of 
dissected and adjudged at considerable 
at incalculable cost to the state. 
The rich and the gifted will a 
have contracts drawn to meet their spec 
realm of scciety has nc call for such ref 
protection against exploitation is their 





The other alternative, which is 
support -- at the outset, it should be 
function of spousal support in divorce 
for women in special circumstances, not for 





all women who are 
no que that it 
should be increased to very more reali ls. However, let 
it not be for one moment imagined that increasing spousal support 
will per se alter the come to grim economic position of the vast 
majority of divorced women today. In five cases out of six, 
spousal support is simply not awarded. Straight away then, more 
than 83 percent of divorced women would be total unaffected by 
any mandated increase. 
Next, of the less than 17 percent that remain, the less 
than 17 percent of divorced women who are awarded spousal support 
and to whom any increase could conceivably apply, it must be 
noted that most are awarded support for only a brief duration, 
four or five years while they are so-called "rehabilitating" 
themselves. Yes, even after twenty years out of the work 
the great ma~ority suffer modification to and even termination 
of, their awards in time. Many are simply not paid 
enforcement is often difficult and costly. Some are not actually 
receiving spousal support at all but child support disguised as 
spousal support, a tax maneuver to lure unwilling fathers into 
contributing towards the maintenance of their offspring. Others, 
again, become disqualified through remarriage which inexplicably 
requires that a homemaker forfeit all further compensation for 
the career that she has subordinated to the needs of prior 
husband and family. 
Since spousal support is reversible, any mandated 
increase, be that an increase of amount or an increase of 
applicability, could be liquidated at short order. Thus, most of 
even the small 17 percent of women who are initial awarded, but 
for one reason or another are not receiving, spousal support 
would also be unaffected or only briefly affected by any mandated 
increase. The truth is that there is an almost total lure on 
the part of society today to even recognize, let alone 
compensate, the homemaker for the sa.crifice of her own 
independent paid career in the interest of family and society at 
large. In consequence, she is being mercilessly exploited in 
divorce today on a grand scale. 
It can safely be concluded that, were increased spousal 
support awards instituted, few divorced women would receive any 
benefit at all, and that the state would continue to support the 
bulk of these women and their progeny at near poverty level while 
subsidizing the ever increasing standard of living of free 
vrheeling ex-husbands. 
The pure mechanics of spousal support awards render this 
alternative ur.availing. The most compelling reason, however, for 
rejecting the solution is that the fundamental properties of 
spousal support deny the principle of equal partnership, the 
legal bedrock of the institution of marriage. Homemakers are 
looking to implementation of the law. Specifically, they are 
looking to permanent. compensation that is conunensurate with the 
permanent, the irreversible retardation suffered by their careers 
through the subordination by mutual agreement of their own 
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separate economic interest to the interest of their spouses, 
families, and the world beyond. 
I have a very brief comment to make on why AB 525 would 
help. It recognizes the homemaker's contr on to the family 
and society and compensates her for her career I'm 
frankly dismayed that in all the sented today, 
apart from H.r. McAlister, I have heard so about the child-
rearing and nurturing role of women, about the contribution of 
her homemaking skills. Is there no one present who values what 
his mother or his wife represented in his or her life? 
AB 525 will encourage women to make a real choice 
regarding homemaking and motherhood, a choice based on the sure 
knowledge that she will not be penalized for in the end. It 
will preserve family life as we know and it. It will 
eliminate the lottery aspect of divorce sett It will 
minimize the opportunities for career s to manipulate their 
incomes at settlement time. It will help tc equalize credit 
opportunities by creating a right v1here that was previously only 
privilege and sometimes nothing at all. Above all, it will 
implement the principle of community property and no-fault law. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Are there any 
other witnesses who would like to testify? 
MS. SANDRA KARINEN: Yes. My name is Sandra Karinen, 
and I'm from Davis, California. I'm one of the probably very few 
civorced women here, and I'm representing myself but, I imagine, 
quite a number of others. 
I was married for eight years. When we were initially 
married, we were both in school. I actual in fact was slightly 
ahead of my husband in terms of completing a degree. However, my 
education ceased at that point. Mine was deferred in favor of my 
husband's. I thought (found out later to the contrary) that we 
had an agreemen-t~ that, when his education was completed, mine 
would be completed later on. That never did occur. I put him 
through his final year of college, four years of medical school, 
and three years of postgraduate training. 
What were the community assets at the end? There was a 
house. I bought it. There were cars. I bought them. There was 
a retirement, my retirement hecause he had been put through 
school because I had chosen to go out in the work force. I 
workeo. hard. What happened aftervmrds in terms of considerations 
of his medical equipment, his vast medical library ch I had 
purchased? Wf!re they considered community property even? No. 
They were considered personal property. 
What's happened since then? I was emotionally, 
physically beaten. I agreed to an out-of-court settlement, a 
small aware of alimony brought in according to standards of the 
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county in which I res That amounted to $250. ly 
afterwards, I found out that my husband jumped into a private 
He has 
sappeared 
practice, and is now earning around $100,000 a 
continued to go on. That small amount has just 
through litigation costs. Four years I'm 
litigation. When will it stop? I don't The 
11 
now 
beneficiaries of the current system are 
that, with one exception, they're gone. 
I know 
I feel that perhaps there th AB 525, 
but in general I think it's trying to problem which 
desperately needs to be attacked. I something is better 
than nothing as it currently stands. Those that might be 
the few exceptions that would find out they ing to be 
overwhelmingly, unfairly treated through AB 525 --
I'm sure there is going to be a lawyer 
through litigation and it 11 be re 
think the time has been past due that 
so I think in spite of the fact that there are a few probleros, 
something desperately needs to be done. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: May I ask a que on? This is just a 
theoretical question. Did you anticipate that might 
happen 5n terms of your marriage not lasting forever? 
MS. KARINEN: No, I did not. J didn't anticipate 
getting left with a child that's sjx months old, especially. 
CHAIR}~N HARRIS: Let me ask st What do 
or prenuptial 
I 
you think about the notion of antenuptia 
agreements? I was just wondering whether 
In terms of just clarifying, we're trying 
not litigate these kinds of problems. 
you wou 1 with it? 
to gure out how to 
HS . Kl',RINEN: I know. We 11, I sh I had I had an 
oral agreement; it was for naught. I was but not that 
young when I was married. You don't neces ly think of that. 
You're just not concerned with that. You 't find out until 
harsh reality sets in. ~ lot of friends of learned 
through my unfortunate experiences. I just didn't know, and, as 
I say, unfortunately because I did accept the out-of-court 
settlement my casP was bifurcated on the issues. The 
courts have deemed it necessary that from there on out I'm able 
to handle my own legal costs. 
CHAIRJIIIAN HARRIS: Would you be satisfied, when I'm 
saying "satisfied," I mean feel made whole or, at least -- oh, I 
don't know how to describe it because it's kind of difficult to 
put any kind of value on these kinds of situations -- if in fact 
there was some economic renumeration relative to your sacrifice? 
MS. KARINEN: Yes. I think something to be done. J 
gave up my career. The reason he got through was he not only had 
a breadwinner, he had a homemaker. I provided meals at the 
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hospital when he was going through. I did all kinds of things; I 
took care of everything else. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You feel cheated. 
MS. KARINEN: Yes. I would love to try and go back tn 
school. One, I don't have the money. Two, it would be very 
difficult because I don't have a househusband. Now, I'm a single 
parent, and I'm earning money, but it's all going back right into 
our legal system. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. 
MS. KARINEN: I can't foresee when I will ever get out 
of wherP I am. I'm in a career that I did not intend to be in. 
I'm boxed in. I've gone as high as I can go. I just can't 
foresee where I can get ahead. I can't stop to go to school 
because, if I do -- I do have some retirement -- I'd be giving 
that up. I really feel strongly that the courts will take care 
of the other problems. If we just keep waiting and waiting and 
waiting, nothing is going to be done. It's only going to get 
worse. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS (To the Co~mittee): Are there any 
questions 
(To Ms. Karinen) Thank you. 
Are there any other witnesses who ~1ould like to testify? 
That will conclude the testimony. I do want to 
acknowledge certainly the large number of people who would be 
affected by this bill. Obviously, they could not all testify. 
Some could not testify because of the logistical problem of our 
being in San Diego. We always have that problem whenever we try 
to have a hearing in this vast state. 
Certainly, anyone may send \tlri tten information, but we 
really want things that. are appropriate. \ve simply don't need 
people telling us their personal horror stories bec~use we 
acknowledge and we stipulate that those kinds of things exist 
where peopl.e have not received the benefit of their bargain as a 
result of the marriage contract. We do want to try to come to 
some realistic conclusions as to what is an appropriate 
legislative solution, if any, to this prnblern. We therefore 
welcome any jnformation that would help us in trying to reach the 
solutions that Mr. McAlister's seeking with AB 525. 
~r. McAlister, do you have anything that you would like 
to add in closing? 
ASSEMBLY:fv1AN McALISTER: Not many people are here to hear 
anything I have to say anyway. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I mean for 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: If it's going to for the 
record, I would like to express my disappo in the 
organized bar. Of course 1 one of their is to look at 
things with a fine tooth comb and to what legally 
could go wrong with any proposal. I I'm a 
lawyer, and I do a lot of that myself as a slator. It's 
certainly important to analyze a proposal and find out all the 
legal things that could go wrong with But, it seemed to me 
that I detected an almost total lack of sensitivity to the social 
problem. Now, that doesn't mean that my 11 was the best way to 
solve it if they've got a better solution, but, with the 
exception of the one gentleman, I believe s name was Wagner •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Wagner. 
ASSEMBLY¥.tAN McALISTER: He, at least, partially 
recognized there's a problem. The others, particularly the one 
gentleman, just virtually denied the existence of a problem, and 
I think that is putting on blinders. 
I 1 m just appalled that members of the organized bar 
could with a straight face tell us, "Well, it's not really much 
of a problem and, to the extent that there is one, why a little 
fine tinkering can take care of it." It's a major problem, and 
to have lawyers who represent the bar come before us here and, in 
the one gentleman's case, not even to ever of Lenore 
Weitzman's study is really somewhat disappointing. 
There is a profound social problem here. If we don't 
solve it, if the Supreme Court doesn't so it, 's going to go 
on. It's going to fester. 
The one gentleman who did have some suggestions 
suggested that we tinker further with Section 4801. That may be 
better than nothing. I've done some of that tinkering myself 
already. One of the subsections that he referred to was put in 
there largely as a result of my bill, AB 437, of a few years ago. 
That's subsection one of Section 4801. I can't tell, frankly, 
from what I've learned since then that my bill really had any 
great effect out there in the real world. It was aimed at 
helpir1c; the long-term house\·i.i fe who had foregone empioyment 
opportunities, and I certainly haven't had anyone beating a path 
to my door telling me that my bill solved all of their problems. 
I think it's had a very minor, modest effect, if any. 
I wish there were a little more social sensibility by 
the bar as to these problems. If they don't like my approach, 
then why don't they develop one that's sounder? I might even 
support it, but I don't sense that they're about to do that. 
CHAIRJ.U\_N HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. McAlister. I certainly 
want to tell you that we're here because of your bill. There's 
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no question in my mind that we would not be engaged in this 
vigorous discussion or giving the kind of attention that we're 
giving to this matter had it not been for your bill. 
I'm confident that something will come out that will be 
steps in the right direction, but whether or not people will be 
totally satisfied, of course, is always in doubt. I've 
determined that we won't be able to satisfy everyone's concerns. 
I do think, however, that we are going to look at this issue 
seriously and try to come up with some solutions that will, at 
least, start to deal with the social problems that Mr. 
McAlister's outlined. 
Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 
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To whom it may concern Page 2 November 16, 1983 
stantial retirement interests, based on earnings which include those 
reali from his earning-capacity ~nCJtea;.,e gained in the operations of 
our marriage partnership. 
I regarded our marriage, from its outset, as an equal partnership. 
So did principles of community-property law, a;., tong a;., a wa-!> bdact. ~1y 
husband was enabled to concentrate on his career full time and continuously 
during our marriage (and largely for three years afterward) because of my 
having taken on our domestic responsibilities: responsibilities incurred 
jo~ntty by, and belonging equatfy to, both of us. I was enabled to support 
hlm in tfUJ:, manner because he supported me financially. And my pJr..e..oe11ce ).n 
the home wa;., ofi 110 -te..oJ.. woJr..th to the 6~y, J..ociety and poJ.:Jte.JU.ty than wa!> 
YU!:, pJr..Me.11ce ~11 cMe.eJr.. Meld. My equality with him in woJr..th entitled 
me, in accord with the expectation implied by our partnership, to share 
with him on an e.quat ba;.,).J.; whatever economic benefits -- whether acquired 
or -- were generated by the opeJr..atiol1'-> of the partnership. The 
post-divorce earnings realized as a result of his earning-capacity ~nCJtea.-je 
an increase gained ~n the c.ontext o6 the Jr..e..opoM~bilitie..o o6 oUJr.. ma-'t-
- are benefits of those operations. 
It might be said that my half of the interests in the increase was 
earned during f of my husband's workday: the half released to him, in 
accord with our mutually agreed-upon arrangement, by my taking on ~~ half 
of our jointly incurred domestic responsibilities during that time --
while I was not pursuing a paying career of my own. 
I am angry over the hypocrisy of law that retrospectively de~e..o the 
equal of my with that of my husband. . .. angry over having 
been in retroactive ~rtde.ntUJr..e.d J.J~'tv~tude to him for the duration of 
our marria (and largely so for three years afterward). . .. angry 
over ng been reed into the position of a beggar in the courts . 
. . . angry over the put-down implicit in the courts' treatment of me 
r law that is .ouppMed to treat the two parties to a divorce as having 
had equal worth and dignity throughout their marriage, with no fault 
charged to party, but which has treated me as though I had been 
the culprit. And I am angry that millions of other women have been treated 
with the same nd of injustice -- in short, expto~ted! 
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AlL TOO OFTEN our laws are framed 
without to fundamental 
only according to how they can manip-
ulate Not so with Bill 
<McAlister) authored 
McAlister, D-San Jose, the 
follow: 
e The woman a man marries is pre-
sumed worthy with himself; other-
he would not have chosen to marry 
her. 
e The domestic responsibilities of the 
are incurred 
to husband and 
support re!;ponsJ,o 
cru»<C'O"C worthiness relative to 
that of the diminishes because of the 
manner in which these are 
The of wife's pres-
the home, for example, is equally 
worthy with that of the husband's presence 
in his career field. 
e Her on their domestic 
bilities during his workdays enables to 
whatever benefits he acquires and/or 
accrues in career, as would her sup-
porting him. for through medical 
I! How they delegate their ,."'''""'"" 







Re AB 525: 
ADDRESSING PROBLEM OF ASCERTAINING THE EARNING-CAPACITY 
WHICH A PERSON MAY HAVE ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE: 
This problem has been stated as an objection to Assembly Bill 525. 
Yet, the courts have long been required by California Civil Code Sections 
246 and 4801(a) to be able to evaluate a person's earning capacity. And, 
in 1982, subsections (e) and (f) were added to Section 4801 (to assure 
that formerly dependent spouses would enter the paid work force after 
divorce, and to measure their earning capacity). These refer to "voca-
tional training consultants," whose expertise is defined under Section 
720 of the California Evidence Code. One of their professional qualifi-
cations is the ability to analyze and evaluate work skills. 
At the outset of a marriage, each spouse had certain qualifications 
and experience which, on dissolution of the marriage, such consultants 
would be able to retrospectively evaluate, stating their marketable value 
in current-dollar terms as the earning capacity which the person had when 
the marriage began. They would be able to make a similar evaluation of 
the person's qualifications and experience at the end of the marriage. 
Under law from AB 525, each party would submit to the court the four 
figures that he or she thinks are correct: the one for himself/herself 
at the beginning of the marriage, the one for himself/herself at the end, 
and parallel figures for the other party. On the basis of the testimony 
of the vocational experts, the court would then ascertain the earning-
capacity , if any, gained by each party during the marriage. The 
percentage which the increase constitutes of the total earning capacity 
at the end of the marriage measures the ~nv~tment of the marriage paht-
HC.ft~h~p in the person's total earning capacity thenceforth. 
This percentage of the resultant eMrU.ng<'> must be p!Lopeir%.y. Con-
trary to what some have advocated, half it may not rightly be desig-
nated spousal support for 
h f may be so designated 
community-property law 
ghtly required to es 
age of earnings as 
capacity was gai 
enti ement, once es 
order. 
the person's ~poUJ.>e any more than the other 
for the pe!Lhon. In consistency with principles 
and no-fault divorce, no other condition may 
lish en t1ement to the appropriate percent-
than the fact that the increase in earning 
the marriage. Unlike a spousal-support award, 
lished, may not rightly be eliminated by court 
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THE PENINSULA TIMES TRIBUNE 
Friday, November 14, 1980 
About wasted lives 
Thts is about a "wasted iife"-min<' 
1 am a mother and a grandmother. 
now divorced. wah 25 years of homt~­
makmg bt'hmd me. My daughter is m 
collegt.· prepanng for a career in soc1al 
sen·1ce. Mv sons. both colkge gradu-
att''- holdm.g respl!nsible posittons. sup-
port the state wtth high taxes. 
This state has told me that marnage 
d1d not makL• me an equal partner with 
mv husb:md ·- that my role was less 
worthv than his. He and the state have 
evaluated as almost negligtble my con-
tribution to the earning-capacity in-
crease which he gained while I took on 
his equal share, as well as my own. of 
our jointly incurred domestic responsl· 
bllJties during his workdays. 
He and his second w;fe keep for 
themsel\·es nearly all of the mterests m 
thts increase. 
Meanwhile. I stumble along out of 
~~n·p p~tSl nmldle nt"ar the bottom 
of the JOb market _ hom•·· 
maker" program can retneve 2':J .;-ears 
ol mv llfe - to say nothmg of suost·· 
quen.t years of reelmg: stunned and off 
b,thmce. mv health d1min1shed. undc-r 
shock of th~ astomshmg posltlOn of the 
state regarding my former role 
The tragic part of this story is that it 
multiplied millions of times throughout 
the countrv As intended by the "sona! 
changer~,: these stones provide the ex· 
ample~ given sanction .the 
state - of what young women 
not do w1th thetr lives They are part of 
~omen's liberatiOn." the mon·nH:nt 
to !Jberate people from the1r 
responsibilities as parents. The idea is to 
have the state takE> over thl'se 
bt!ltJes. whill' both fathers and 
careers and pay taxes. so 
that control may be com· 
pkte- so that all may be automatons 
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THE PniiNSULA MES TRI E 
Satu , February ? , 1981 
'Back bosh 
Led one Michael Minton. a Chica-
go h.tv;ryer, there is currently a move-
ment to price-tag the past "services" of 
former homemakers going through di-
vorce. Several weaknesses inhere in 
Minton's framework" for ali-
than treat the homemaker 
as one of the partners in an equal part-
nership forming the basic unit of so-
ciety, he reduces her role to a mere per-
formance of services. (According to The 
Family Law 9/11179. Minton 
had actually considered price-taggmg a 
wife's sexual "services" based on a 
-The quality performance may 
have been either better or worse than 
that warra11ting Minton's, tags. 
And the claim on each 
"service" would be contro-
versiaL Thus, two bones of conttcnuon 
are thrown into what is supposedly a 
"no fault" situation, with the former 
homemaker in the defensive. (Would 






her role the equal dignity it deserw~ 




division of income 
LENORE WEITZMAN (May 27, Page B-
5, Mid-Peninsula edition) notes that "An 
equitable division of family income offers 
the only possible cushion against the finan· 
cia! hardship that divorce brings, , ." 
I propose as "an equitable division" the 
former spouses' equal sharing of the ongo-
interests in the earning-capacity .lll: 
~ gained by each spouse during tbe 
marriage. 
In probably most marriages there iS a 
real-dollar increase in at least one party's 
earning capacity. (This is distinct from a 
nominal-dollar increase, which would not 
take into account the changed nominal 
value. at the time of divorce, of the earning 
capacity at the marriage's outset) If this 
increase consitututes 40 percent of the 
party's earning capacity at the time of di· 
vorce, 20 percent of his/her gainful-em-
ployment earnings would belong irrevers-
iblY to the other spouse for the remainder 
of ·the party's working life. as would the 
appropriate shares of tax liabilities and at-
tached benefits (including bonuses. profit 
shares and unemplo·rrnent benefits). The 
percentage should be assigned directly to 
the other spouse from its source. For Social 
Securi!y purposes. the 20 percent should be 
countedin the earnings record of the obl1· 
gee. not that of the obligor The concept 
sheds surer light on other retirement lnte~­
ests. as welL 
Spousal support would still be due. in ad-
dition. when marriage-incurred child-care 
responsibilities preclude the custodial par· 
ent's full-time gainful employment or when 
a decline in the obligees own earning ca· 
pacity during the marriage necessitates a 
period of appropriate traming or educa· 
tion. 
Those concerned about justtce tn famJl\' 
law should bring to their legislators· atten-
tion Weitzman's study and the need for 
~~ated reform (If the ££:!_rG could bt: 
counted on to rightly JUdge and order w!nl 
is equitable, we divorcees would not be m 
the inequitable economic CJrcumstance::-
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SAN J')S[ f~ERCURY NE'lS, Saturday '!arch 19, 1 '183 
Fairness when a marria Sf\'~ JOSE ~1ERCURY NPJS 
saturr'ayC~1arch 26, 1981 Far from vague, as Joanne AR 52:'i pn1dd•'" a prf'<:'ise means of 
ascertawing ~he percenlagt> of a pPr-
son's po-:t-di\·orcP earnings attrihutahiE> 
to tra:ni:-~g. t>rluc!tlon and experiencP 
acquired duri1,g marriage. The bill 
address€ an increase m earning 
capJdty achit>ved by .!!!!Y means_ 
Everytim:g on0 does, not merely 
acqu:rinE; a p1 ofe~-;...,ional dt>gree, con-
tributP::: to J,•s future. Hts spo!L'>f' also 
contnbutb tfor <·xample. by bParmg 
ana h's children :md ta~ 
their other incurred domestic 
allowing him 
tlmP aw! freedom to pursue his carf'<'r 
int< res!>; Tht' law must address onlv 
v.h_,( the marriagf' ii~'tually achieves. 
not some <:peculation about what 1t 
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ln response to Elame Elweli's March 
te is involuntarv servi-
tudP A P£rson is just ·that 
another pers:on. S0 just call It bv ib 
true naJr,Q: slavery. I am not rcf('rrin); 
to child support 
If a pt'rson wanL<; payrnePt thf' law 
should rFad th<~t hP or sh0 nw :t per-
fonq lalx'r o'rwr \dit:,d:>k con~adu-
r rn. Tho:· 1·1·;, state~ that no 
gre"tH I l• ~-h~>•'J h•· l.t~d upon 
one than L;l· (rtr:f r:-.: 1:1 th~· 
an,l < -I TtHS <"an be 
corr··~ruh. tn h·' ··c;·v('~ ar.~d u;·,u:~ual po~-
"'*3814 f\Tc: r'{U P.cc(d 
S,TJ" Jc·jc, C-\ 951~7 
comprised two equally 
as one in the context 
ncurred responsibilities that 
st prior to their m2rriaqe. 
e arose from that joint base, 
tu a sin e legal entity.* 
divorce precludes any charge 
pause was less worthy than 
the o her. Hence, the 1 aw must recognize 
he equal worth of their respective con-
tribu on , whether direct or indirect, 
to increase. 
(McAli ret al) would recon-
statute the principles of equal-
in such a way that the 
may no lon , in violation of 
, retroac iv y ace women in invol-
ser'vi tude. 
- JoAnn "1ader 
u divorce than before he was married 
the marria , he earns more tr:c·1:c1, per 
ulli n pro ided during her marriage 
law to be ent tled to the recompense 
r communi pro law and no-fault di-
And so did a housewife who had taken on the 
child-care and other domestic 
the hu band t time and freedom to acquire :~1:d 
ched through the arrangement to his paying career, 
n his earning-capacity increase. 
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CL'NCERNING THE ALLEGED INEQUITY OF A PERSON'S NOT BEING ENGAGED IN GAINFUL 
EMPLOYMENT WHILE SHARING EQUALLY WITH HER EX-SPOUSE THE EARNINGS REALI ZeD A..S A 
RESULT OF THE YNCREASE TN HIS EARNING CAPACITY GAINED DURING THEIR MARRIAGE: 
Whether or not a person works at a paying job after divorce is irrelevant 
to her moral right to share equally in the percentage of the earnings arising 
from the earning-capacity increase which her erstwhile spouse gained during the 
marriage. She has a£heady worked for her share -- just as he has already worked 
for his counterpart share -- duning the ~ge. He is now capable of realizing 
more e.a':.YL,Lng.o per hour than he was before he married her (tte.at earnings -- that 
is, taking into account the changed value of the norn,tnal dollar), but he does 
not have to spend any more t,Lme. per hour doing so. 
In the case of a traditional marriage, if his earning capacity is higher 
at the end than at the beginning, the increase is reasonably attributable 
largely to the fact that he. was not taking on the bulk of the domestic respon-
sibilities incurred jointly with his wife, but instead had the time and free-
dom to pursue his career continuously and full time. (That he could have hired 
someone to take over his equal share of those responsibilities is irrelevant; 
it was his w-Lce who shouldered them [even if she had household help in the pro-
cess, just as he may have had a secretary or other employees working for lum]. 
Nor did her equal worth with him -- to the family, society and posterity --
diminish by reason of the way they delegated their roles.) It is their joint 
efforts and sacrifices --work attteady done, dutting the matt!tlage. -- that account 
for the earning-capacity increase (which enables him to realize greater per-hour 
earnings than before he married her)*. 
It is impossible, of course, for the person to receive any gainful-employ-
ment earnings at al£ if neither he nor his ex-spouse is gainfully employed (or 
if her earning capacity had not increased during the marriage), whereas it L6 
possible (conditionally) for the ex-spouse to receive .oome earnings (her share 
of those accrued during the marriage) even though .ohe may not be gainfully 
employed. Her advantage in this, however, is justified by hl-6 advantage in 
having control, and her not having control, over his employment. If he does 
continue in, or resume, gainful employment, it would be wrong, tte.gattdee.,.~6 of 
what ~ does or does not do, for him to keep her half of what had accrued 
through their joint efforts and sacrifices. It would, in fact, be retroac-
tively exploiting her -- placing her in indentured servitude to him. And this 
is precisely what is happening in millions of divorce cases under present law. 
Of course, if the ex-spouse has a child or children at home (as most 
divorcees do have), she Lo working. Even if the youngest is as old as 14 (or 
even older), she has 24-hour-a-day responsibility for him or her as long as 
he r he is a minor and is not emancipated by law. The jointly incurred respon-
sibility for the child belonged equally to husband and wife during their marriage; 
-----------
*That he might have gained the same increase had he not married is irrelevant. 
He marry, incurring responsibilities that he v:ould not have incurred other-
wise -- responsibilities which, had he fulfilled them directly himself, would 
have made it impossible for him to have the time and freedom that he d{d have 
to pursue his career. 
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the extra burden it now on her balances the fact that she is no 1onge 
performing other domestic duties in behalf of the father except those she 
performs in connection with their child or children. By insisting on her 
taking a paying job after divorce (even if by sharing equally in the reo-
nomic benefits acquired and accrued during the marriage she would not 
to take a paying job), the state places her value as an economic 
resource higher her value as a parent. Nor should it be the pre-
rogative of the state to speculate as to the best interests of the child 
relative to the custodial parent 1 s working, or not working, in the 
force (that is, unless she cannot provide for herself and the 
or children with equitable child support from the other parent and 
h f of the economic benefits acquired and aeeAu~d through the operation 
of their marriage partnership). If she has the responsibility, she ou t 
to be allowed the to exe se it as she sees fit as long as 
does not abuse the children. 
If the father has custody of a child or ldren of the marria 
he, too, ought to be allowed the same choice without intervention on 
part of the state (but of course with the same tipulations). 
As for the case wherein both husband and wife worked continuously 
and full time at paying careers throughout their marriage ( 
hired someone to perform their domestic tasks and having put 
dren in day-care centers immediately a they were born [and, if they 
have a child, the wife, by having given birth to him/her, has alrea 
contributed more to the marriage, society and posterity than has the h 
ban ). there still remain intan es contributing to, or 
ing , the advancement of their res ve careers: intangibles 
i the state has no business interveni g. Un no-fault divorce l 
state may neither right y a to evaluate them nor ignore them 
but must regard hum the contributions of each spouse as 
ually worthy with the 6um of the contributions of the To 
be istent recogni on of the ity of the marriage 
s ip (the state's ing rightly ized such equality while 
intact) a with no-fault vorce law, the state must requ 
rties to a divorce to share equally in all that was 
tions of partnership. And, 
c~ aMeJt , this includes the po 
on of ea~nings i as a result of the earning-capaci 
gained by each spouse duri the marria The principles stated here 
pply to at£ marriages, tra onal or otherwise. But in most of the 
"otherwise" marriage cases there will be greater offset (unless one pouse 
tops his or her ng work, which the other might likewise ). 
### 
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Lady in Green 
somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff 
not my poems or a dance i gave up in the street 
but somebody almost walked off wid alla my stuff 
... this is mine/this yr stuff/ ... 
what can anybody do somethin of no value on 
a open market/ ... now wontchu put me 
this is mine/now me my stuff/ .. . 
i gotta have tog to my choice/ .. . 
now you cant have me less i me 
... you cant have them or do nothin 
stealin my s--- from me/ dont make 
makes it ... my stuff the 
ripped off treasure of the year/ ... this is not 
your prerogative/i gotta have me in my 
dont ya find & leave 
of me for my des to 
i 11 give it to really my 
ya it to me/if ya real want i'm 
the only one/can handle 
for colored girls who 
have considered suic 




TO ALL COMMITTEE MEMBERS: 
This paper is submitted to you in the spirit of the future. 
Because of the views expressed within, many of which are 
unpopular with patriarchs and myopic feminists, I feel it 
appropriate to preface them with a more personal note. 
For the record, I am an American black woman: not a black 
woman of the privileged middle-class; not a particularly 
educated black woman, but rather, an ordinary black woman 
who believes that deviating from the tenets of independence 
and self-help--the hallmarks of my American status--will, 
in the future, limit me much more than my blackness or my 
womanliness. 
We, as a people, are entering into a new age. We have no 
guidelines for our future. There are no pat answers on 
which to fall back. The leveling factor for the young, 
the old, men, women, whites and people of color in our 
country is our of individualism. It is this heritage 
of individualism, with its concomitant freedom of choice 
which will allow us and even command us to come together 
as families, coworkers and friends. 
Many have argued that this "individualism and freedom bunk 
is fine for white males who have always had their fair 
share of both, but what about blacks and women who only 
share a historical status as subordinates?" "What about 
the tradition of dependence and sacrifice which has been 
our fate?" "Don't men 'owe' us something for that?" 
I can only answer from my experential base. I can only 
answer as a former dependent and as a past frightened woman. 
Simply, I discovered that my entrenchment into "You owe me" 
and "After all I've done for you" pushed me deeper into the 
quicksand of dependence, self-hatred and bitterness. My 
redemption was the realiz that no one "owes" anything 
to anyone. We come together because we give of ourselves; 
because we want to give and love and trust. But in the 
final analysis each of us must recognize that there is a 
self from which we 
v 
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In today's where myths about the permanence of 
the "place and motherhood, and the father's 
no longer reflect a stable real there is a need for 
contingent thinking and 1 contingent thought and 
lifestyle need not exclude trust, but it does set as the 
model for and free choice the recognition that 
our actions, choices and expectations must be tempered 
an that relationships once thought 
may and ect to individual freedom and 
change. 
This type of contingency thought and lifestyle leaves the 
underlying s of marriage and family 
those of sharing and giving freely with no strings and 
expectations for restitution. Concepts of community and 
partnership will remain intact. But added to the fami 
calculus will be the proper and recurring questions--
"If I do this, am I to let it stand as a ft 
of love "Are we prepared to go our separate ways and 
stand firm in our commitment to our children's best 
sts?" 





I am vigorously opposed to AB 525, both as a statute and as 
a reflection of a lo I have compiled a list of major 
defects in AB 525 from a s , cultural, philosophical, 
This paper is written not and public pol 
as an exhaustive is of all the issues involved with the 
the proposed passaged of AB 525 and similar legislation, but 
as an attempt to to the attention of this committee 
highlights of those issues which are most objectionable. 
There is indeed a problem. Women and children are definite 
victims in divorce actions But they are not so much 
victims of a husband and father as much as they are victims 
of an "outworn historical reality, a reality that has ceased 
to exist but that 
carefully preserved, as 
1982:2) 
alive in the collective memory, 
still prevailed."(Bernard, 
While I have compiled li t of major defects in AB 525, I 
also hope that the list will have a pos ive effect, in that 
future s 
and help to alleviate a 
AB 525: 
• Is a " +-" '-
will take account of these issues 
responsibly and fairly. 
11 and is harmful to the equal 
rights of both women and men 




0 Is a dual 
aid 
0 Invades 
in sex di crimination 
slat sm 
marriage and encourages marriage as a 
ary venture 
and harms those it purports to 
0 Violates l 
0 Deprives men and women of their ght to acquire 
education and useful knowledge 
0 Creates a system of 
men and women of their 
• s 
the 
servitude and deprives 
post-dissolution earnings 
th the decision to enter 
l 
93~ 
To better understand AB 525 and these issues one must look 
close at the cultural basis for AB 525. Culture is 
here to refer to life passed on 
of This " ... values 
of of 
relat 1975:2) In this 
ques must be answered: 
1. What were the effects on women of the 
Fami Law Act? 
cultura 
V'lhat are the effects on women of increased 
dissolution of ? 
3. What does AB 525 to do? 
4. What 
serve, 
function does AB 525 
Who is by AB 5 5? 
l. WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS ON WOMEN OF THE FAMILY LAW 
Provis with the Fami Law Act, specif , §4 0 
(b) 1) called for the 
Women, who were 
0 
than hal commun 
sion of 
as the 
, were now 





which the fe \vas the 
f 1 8 :772 
aintiff, 
caused many Cali 




no had to pay the 
when in uncontested 
ff. 
of who was pla 
innocence and 
s was 















, which was equal contr 
Kinzer, 1859: 251 
2 
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Subsequent to the Fami 
attempted to regain the 
community property. AB 
objective, at least 
Law Act, (FLA) i wives have 
"more than half" percentage of the 
2. WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS 
OF MARRIAGE? 
The rate of di 
more than realize this 
'VlOMEN OF INCREASED DISSOLUTION 
U.S. from the early 
1960s through the late 
estimated that between 1 
9 Os. Bureau of the Census research 
0 and 978 the rate increased 
157 percent. (U.S. o Commerce 1979) California saw its 
respective share of di solution. The FLA also made the marriage 
contract under no-fault,"a terminable contract, without penalty, 
at the option of ither 
1968 and 1972 the 
from 20 to 15 
and San Francisco 
Clearly the no-faul 
awards were being ied to 
supporting. It can further 
on men and women' 
self-suf 
(Weitzman,l98la:l2 
At the same time 
social change which 












women are at least 
It is ea 
the fact, and ce 
" ,1973 26 8) Between 
awarded alimony dropped 
ivorce cases in both Los Angeles 
and Dixon,l980:154) 
al (spousal support) 
encourage women to become self-
ferred that the statistics 
c statuses prove 
should be encouraged. 
liforn wives, another 
the works--the decline 
Ehrenreich so aptly calls 
Dreams and the 
of the breadwinner 
" 
one a fact, 






the 197 s many men to use their 
to 
in the wake f 












the labor market 
was clear women were now " 


















use as an equalizer o external 
sex and pay 
close the self-
now exists because 
employed and thus 







power of the State to 
AB 5 5 and s lar legis-Fortunately, for 
lation, the in on certain fundamental and 
liberties may be serious 
Professor Baxter write 
"His cal , 
have been free 
as matters o 
for a 
and an occas 




The Harvard Law 
turned on the 
as the pr j 
(Maynard . Hi 
hand, often turn 
the individual, 
contra . 198 
to warrant federal protections. 
latures and courts 
the critical rules 
which were regarded 
concern. Before, 1970, 
th and t decisions, 
ss ion of 
, there was little 
the state-controlled area 
law. The federal judiciary 
att respected 
law marriage and 






, which served 
control. 













"Even though all restrictions on political, personal 
and contractual rights were taken away, and she 
stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an 
absolutely equal plane with him, it would still 
be true that she is so constituted that she will 
rest upon and look to him for protection; ... her 
maternal functions .. justify legislation to 
protect her from the greed as well as the passion 
of man." (Ibid.) is added) 
Often the State's justification for maintaining the husband's 
primary duty to support the need to alleviate the effects 
of past and current sex and pay discrimination in the labor 
market. But by preserving the husband's primary duty to 
support or, in this instance, awarding what is his separate 
property (if property at all) the State strengthens the reason 
many women in the labor market are victims of discrimination: 
women do not need a raise or a better pos since women 
can depend on husbands for support and property. 
The state of California's Supreme Court also speaks about such 
presumptions of women's dependence and need for paternalistic 
protection when in v. Workers' s Board 
(WCAB), (1977) they te: 
"The presumption [of widow's total dependency] 
is a relic of an era in which the majority--
of -- ... accepted as axiomatic that 
'the God of nature made woman frail, lovely 
and dependent ... ' (Citation omitted) 'Frail, 
lovely' she may , but 'dependent' she 
need not be. " ( : 4 0 4) 
More alarming than the blatant 
the deep sense of ism. 
ionism in AB 525 is 
A.J. Richards in his 
and the Constitution: article, 
paternalism is the of human 
on paternalism 
liberal from deep 
, the idea of 
intrinsic limits on the to one person may control 
the life of another even for putatively benevolent motives ... " 
(1980:15) "Paternalistic overprotection degrades its object 








to the fu·ture. 
current " 
because 
that is, between 
new o 





here when the Court speaks 
State of a 
is not an automatic 






ive because it he no 
suffer economic 
sitional" spouses, 
support and the 
There is no 
, career woman has the 
assets" and augment 
se women v-;ho do earn less than 
with a structural 
workers. Her 
should 
system which denies 
and benefits 
as to whom it 
enter the 
to start jobs and 
women ic 
bus nesses. The 
of married 





"What this means is that by the mid-70s a 'tipping 
point; had been reached in the trends of family and 
work. This was the point at which more than half of 
all married women living with their husbands were in 
the labor force, a that is, at which non labor 
force participation became 'deviant' statistically 
speaking and labor force participation by married 
women became 'normative.' Thus the married women 
living with their husbands who were in the labor force 
now constituted the 'mainstream'. Those not in 
the labor force were a 'minority group.'" 
(Ibid.) 
II. DEEPER AB 525 CULTURl\L ISSUES -- "SULLIVAN" AND BEYOND 
There are no easy, snap s and answers in the Sullivan 
case, in which a wife seeks to have her husband'sdegree and 
earning capacity declared community property. (Sullivan,l982: 
634+) Sullivan can be considered a "transitional" case, 
that is, a case between the old bargains and behavior for women 
and the new l But to find justice for the 
future one the critical question : Was Janet 
Sullivan a covertured or free woman? 
A. COVERTURED OR FREE--ARE CALIFORNIA WIVES PROVIDERS,TOO? 
If one believes that Janet Sullivan was a covertured woman 
devoid of any to her husband, and that her 
covertured status superseded any self-sufficiency or no-fault 
sions then her money i overdue. If one further 
believes that it 
wife" and that. the of 
to be the "doctor's 
was a temporary stint until 
she could only educate her husband, then again, her award 
is very late. 
9 
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If on the other hand, one bel s that Janet Sullivan 
was a free adult who handled 
her role as every husband is to do, 
then one may have a 
now 
di 
It is not chance that I 
"handled her role 
to do." If Ms. Sul 
for only a moment 
and remedies for 
Some argue, 
husband has power- is the 
is he? Some scholars 
B. HUSBAND AS 
ONLY ROLE? 








that after the property 
system was 
reimbursement due. 
in the question the phrase, 
as every husband is expected 
the husband role 
that few reimbursements 
flow that 
for that is because a 
f the household." But 
LABOR ~illRKET WORK HIS 
f household" means "he 
f resources 




wife is not 
direct. 





Regarding support, at common law the husband's duty to support 
was reciprocal: he owned, managed and controlled his wife's 
property. Today he pays the cost, but is no longer the boss. 
Bernard summarizes the husband's new position by explaining 
the new language in the census. (1982:15) 
"The rise of the Good-Provider role may be said 
to date from the 1830s when a great deal of work 
formerly done in the home began to be moved into 
outside and its demise may be said to have 
occurred April 1, 1980 when the United States no 
longer assumed that the husband was head of house-
hold. 
;In the 1980 census, the Bureau of the Census ... 
discontinued the use of the terms 'head of household' 
and 'head of family.' Instead the terms 'householder' 
and 'family householder; are ... used.'" 
(Rawlings, 1980:39 as quoted in Bernard, 1982:15) 
Women are independent regarding their own earnings and property 
and husbands no longer have the right to their wive's 
services--modern marriage is a domestic partnership. What 
does this decline of husband as "head of household" mean to 
California women? V'Jhat do the new roles and expectations hold 
in store for women? For one thing, the answers to both 
questions portend added responsibility for one's own decisions 
and actions. No longer will women be able to say, "I did it 
for him" and "He me to do it." It means women and future 
"Janet Sullivans" will have to carefully balance and weigh 
"protective " choice rights". No longer will 
displaced ibil iesbe so easily tolerated ~n women. 
III. DISPLACED RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF THE FREE CALIFORNIA WOMAN 
The difference between "protective rights" and "choice 
rights" can best be explained: 
11 
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t a fe s 
world. 
of a 
upon her a 
coverture. 




The true meaning of encourages people take personal 
responsibility for their future there l no guarantee that 
this responsibil v-li 11 lead to wise decisions. 
must take chances, make mistakes and earn from tht:; 
subsequent results. This i the cycle we cherish 
and dearly refer to sense." 
For many women the respons 
would rather remain " 
to pay for that type of 
lity discussed is frightening. 
." But there s a high price 
It is a "perpetuation of 
earlier attitudes--all which may be but are also 
radically nonadapt in our contemporary world. It is innocence 
withour responsibility.'' (May, 1972:63) Quite frankly, there 
is no democractic way to hol only men responsible as individuals. 
One of the most critical areas in which women must take 
clear responsibil is the decision to be "full-time" 
homemakers. Historically, and even currently many family 
decisions with to support are attributed solely to men, 
with the idea that when a woman leaves the labor market to 
become a "full-time homemaker she is doing so for 9er husbar;~~. 
Phrases, such as, " labor market to devote her time 
to domestic duties" and " 
earning capac ,total 
up her chance for developing 
absolve women of the responsibili 
which says she a 
the labor market. There is 
exclus for women. 
B. THE HOMEMAKER 
The most jealous 
has wi its 




role in the decision to leave 
"homemaker" option 
WOMEN ONLY? 
" " for most women, which 
sponsibil ies but almost none 
American women for 
opt 
homemakers while the husbands bore 
dissolution for that decis 












C. EXPECTATIONS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOH THETH FULFILLMENT 
An extension of a woman's new responsibilities also lie 
in the case of ions and their fulfillment. If the 
answer to the question, "If I do this, am I prepared to let 
it stand as a gift of love?, is no, then must be articulated. 
If educating a spouse brings the expectation of sharing future 
benefits, whether in or after the marriage it must be ccrnrnun-
icated directly and honestly or the spouses will "expect the 
courts, i.e. the government, to redress an inequitable situation 
of the individual's own making.'' (Miller, l983:C-l) The 
California marriage contract (CC§ 5100), only requires mutual 
support. An education is extrinsic to its terms. Property 
contracts, however, between spouses are honored. (Dawley, 1976: 
366) (CC§ 5103) If a "Janet Sullivan" feels support is 
a reimbursable investment then a personal service contract as 
with sports figures is enforceable. 
"Individuals have operated ... as personal managers 
who promise to obtain employment and also to 
develop the star for a percentage of future 
earnings. The personal manager (unlicensed) 
promises to invest his own time and knowledge in 
the development of the actor's skills and talents 
in return for a share of the star's future 
earnings generated in the investment in that human 
capital." (Krauskopf, 1980:390) 
Above all, the presumption f marriage's donative i tent must 
be preserved. 
1953; See v. See, 1966 and 
still believe in the 
as espoused in and 
of marriage 
swold v. Connecticut: 
"[M]arriage is more than a contract. It is not a 
mere matter of consideration. (Maynard v. 
Hill, 1887) 
"[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way 
of life, not causes; ... a bilateral loyalty, not 
a commercial or social project. (Griswold v. 
Connect1cut, 1965:486) 
15 
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icult to achieve 






If so argued, then the " s designed to 
mitigate the continuing consequences of past 
economic abuse be characterized 
not as an slative goal, 
but a state weight to 
meet even the more 'compelling• interest 
standard. ( : 4 0 4) 
The distinctions and thus the important differences between 
Kahn v. Shevin and the proposed bill, AB 525 are: 
l. Arbitrary and he denial of due 
process (See Section VI, infra) 
2. Other fundamental federal r iled. 
3. The presumption of 
classifications. 
onali in t.axation 
4. The means which the ective c be achieved. 
L 




"the act of confe 
deprive 
a benefit upon 
of any substant-
se entitled. (See 
California, 1976:46) 
the spouse with an 
of pos ssolution property 
he or she is entitled. (U.S. Constitution, 
2. Fundamental Federal led 
s 





their judgment produce 
taxa+:ion." (: 355) (emphasis 
525 is a axati case and many ederal rights, 





June Aline Eichbaum 
based privacy versus 
of individual l 
her s 
1 
on the ideology of autonomy-
ains the importance 
"A civil , rooted in the of equality 
and autonomy is ligible in relation to 
individual persons within society. A family-based 
right would bolster the worth of those persons who 
elected to bond together in family ts at the 
cost of shed protection for those who did 
not marry or otherwise live within familial territory." 
(1979: 371-372) 
To view women's ly in the s home 
and men's place in c worlds of work and politics 
"fundamental violate the sed tion 
of treat 
under this 
equal The traditional s 
violates the 
self-fulfillment in terms f th 
rational beings, of their own 
vis 
of women to 
as free and 
II (Richards, 1980:29) 
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C. ''SULLIVAN,, ROLE REVERSl,LS AND DISSOLU'I'TON 
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MAY CLAIJvl IMPAIR!>iENT UPON LEAVING THE LABOR 
~iARKET THUS BUILDING ADDITIONJl.L SUPPORT DAMAGES." 
Rather than 
been relieved of the 
r market and rna 
that when 
that the 
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dome 
( l) ) 
SUPPORT BASED ON THE SUPPORT-
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able 





Evidence Code § 502 gives three possible levels of proof 
which may be red in a case, (1) Proof a preponderendce 
of the evidence, (2) by clear and convincing proof; 
and (3) proof beyond a e doubt. Even fraud may be 
proved by no more than a preponderance of the evidence. 
Sierra v. Brown,l97l:l05) The California Supreme Court 
in Morrison chose a higher level of proof than is ordinarily 
required in civil cases, even a fraud case. 
m) COURT CANNOT ENGAGE IN SPECULATION ABOUT THE ABILITY TO 
MEET FINANCIAL NEEDS IN THE FUTURE. 
The Court cannot and must not engage in speculation. 
It may not "burn its bridges." If the record does not contain 
evidence of the supported spouse's ability to meet his or 
her future needs the Court must maintain jurisdiction. 
(Morrison, 1978:452) 
n) MAY RECEIVE A SPOUSE-SUPPORTED EDUCATION AND TR~INING 
AFTER DISSOLUTION AS REHABILITATIVE SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
The judges 
the "abil to engage in gainful 
employment" which is another of the factors CC§ 4801, 
does not mean that the spouse is compelled to take any 
position that comes I the spouse has potential for 
advanced employment, the Court may order support 
sufficient to provide for living expenses at school or college. 
Clearly the is that if a supported spouse has not 
pursued an education he or she may be 
allowed to do so after "[T)he concept 
of rehabi tative [spousal is premised on the 
as ion that the wife(sic) has been lulled into a sense 
of by and has not prepared herself or 
considered herself for self-support as a newly 
single person." , 1978:957) 
27 
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2. THE SUPPORTING SPOUSE 
a) MAY NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE THE LABOR MARKET AFTER MARRIAGE 
IF A SUPPORTING SPOUSE THUS CAUSING EARNINGS AND SUPPORT 
TO CEASE 
Although the Fami Law Act requires both husband and 
wife to support one another, (CC§§ 242; 5100), until 
Penal Code§ 270 (a} was amended, effective January 1, 1977, 
to apply to both spouses, only a husband could be put in jail 
for failure to his wife. This "husband has primary 
duty to support" obl could have been the basis for a 
wife's recovery of l expenses, etc., if she were 
the supporting spouse and the sex-based obligation still 
existed in California. Professor Krauskopf alludes to this 
when she writes: 
, the 
"The employed spouse/student situation is 
different, however, because the employed wife 
is performing a never imposed by 
society and, , she should not be 
presumed to perform gratuitously." 
(1980: 394) 
statute reads, "mutual support." 
b) FIFTY PERCENT OF ALL EARNINGS ACCRUE TO THE SUPPORTED 
SPOUSE. 
1859:247+) {CC§ 5105) 
CO~~UNITY PROPERTY EARNINGS ARE SUBJECT TO THE COMANAGEMENT 
OF THE SUPPORTED SPOUSE. 
§ 1 5) 
PRIORIT PERSONAL TIME SUBJECT TO DIRECT EARNING 
SCHEDULE 
is e 1 true f a employee with normal 
bus hours. 
MAY DONATE EFFORT, SKILL AND TIME TO A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT 
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF SPOUSE VOLUNTARISM 
(CC§ 5125 )) 
28 
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f) MAY EXPEND COMMUNITY PROPERTY FUNDS FOR AN EDUCATION 
WITH NO REIMBURSEMENT TO COMMUNITY 
g) MAY HAVE TO COMPENSATE THE SUPPORTED SPOUSE FOR LEAVING 
THE LABOR MARKET. 
The law assumes that the supported spouse is leaving the 
labor market at the behest of the supporting spouse to 
perform "domestic duties." This presumption when coupled with 
the community property concept means that the supported spouse 
upon leaving the labor market, accrues an interesting "two-fold" 
interest in both the support and the property interests of a 
marriage both based on presumptions. The interest is an 
equal interest in the community property and an impairment 
interest in the support aspects of marriage. (CC§ 480l(a) (6)} 
h) MAY BE LIABLE FOR 
RATHER THAN ON 
ABILITY TO EARN 
EVEN IF UNEMPLOYED. 
Under the rules enunciated by the California judiciary, 
a support order can be imposed on a supporting spouse, 
even if unemployed, if the spouse can be gainfully employed 
or if the spouse has the ability to earn. The Court is thus 
free to speculate that the supporting spouse will work and 
to force the spouse to work under penalty of jail. (See 
In re Marri of Chala, 1979:999; In reMarriage of Rome, 
1980:965) The supported spouse, on the other hand, will be 
forced to work only if the record "clearly indicates" that 
the spouse will be able to adequately meet financial needs. 
The Court cannot guess nor speculate about future earnings. 
It should be noted that Chala was a 62 year old man and the 
speculation on his employability was the "husband can be 
gainfully employed by his sons at their service station." 
(Chala, 1979:999) 
i) MAY PAY SUPPORT INDEFINITELY AFTER A "LENGTHY" MARRIAGE 
(Brantner, 1977:416+; Neal, 1979: 834+) 
29 
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j) MUST PROVE SUPPORTED SPOUSE'S ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY MEET 









l Code was amended to 
supply evidence for the 
consultants to pro-
(See CC§ 4801 (e), (f)) 
k) MAY BE ORDERED PROVIDE "APPROPRIATE" EDUCATION AND 




Under the current judicial and slative interpretations 
of the rules and responsibilit f ing and supported 
spouses it is clear that Mark Sullivan and other men who either 
are or may be in the spouse role may: 
--Leave the labor market 
--Earn no Wages 
--Claim "homemaker" status 
--Comanage the co~~unity funds 
--Attend school, sional or others 
--Meet the community obl 
duties 
ion through "domestic 
--Dissolve the marriage at will under no-fault 
--Start work in the labor market 
--Maintain the earnings with 
no reimbursement 
Moreover, the spouse, in the case of Janet Sullivan, 
were she a husband, would presumably be told 
legislature she: 
the Court and 
--Elected to be the spouse 
--Mainta property 
--Agreed to the spouse's educat s 
--Should be 
marriage 
--Is not 1 
spousal s 
marriage and started 
A "reimbursement o 
added to the 
an education in the 
after dissolution 
nor rehabilitative 
spouse was educated in the 
after dissolution. 
expenses" clause must be 
Code, to rebut the donation 
-------------~-----------
of community funds (See California Law Revision 
Commission, of Educational 
s, 1983) As the law stands currently a supported or =--"-----
supporting spouse may receive an education in marriage with the 
education of spouse under the aegis 







1 to pursue 
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Over the past decade, however, 
occurred which chall nge a 
about marriage. They are: 
and legal changes have 
ete tatc:s' right.s idc:oloqy 
(1) Family relations: women's new roles in the home 
and in the labor market; single and divorced heads 
of household; and increased cohabitation without 
marriage. 
(2) Economic relat between spouses, (Glendon, 1976) 
(3) An expans of the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause and the due process clause of the u.s. 
Constitution ly matters. (Baxter, 1983: 
135) 
These and other social and 
family law toward the 
An example of this 
s a trend in 
of marriage. (Glendon, 1976) 
is the 1970 California Family 
Law Act, (CC§ 4000 et. seq.) with its "no-fault" and dissolution 
of marriage provis 
declared the rna 0 
important than it had been 
of the FLA, the legislature 
the status of marriage was much less 
1872. The parties now were 
allowed to terminate the status of by a mere finding 
of irreconcilable differences (CC§ 4506 with no specific 
pleading, (CC§ 4506) proo 4509) and without corrobora-
tion. 
The Family Law Act so age bas lly two 
realms, one the realm of status, i .. the terms of marriage 
regarding support and obli are codified in CC§ 
5100--mutual , fidel While the State 
was less ted the f the status of marriage, 
(In re Marriage of Walton 197 the terms were 11 very much 









"The idea of as a union o two autonomous individuals 
rather than as a unit 
[beginning to) Wl 
698) The abil 
about property and 
and thus full 
marriage introduced 
individual and marital 
ha a role [in the] .. 
ation." (Glendon, 1976: 
to contract free with one another 
ated issue and the comanagement of 
property in a California 
of the marriage 
and individual interests, both 
of which are fundamental and 
Constitution. It can be 
under the U.S. 
stated that, "[T]he 
Constitution s not] enshrine ' 1' tate interests 
ies. The open-ended 
tution instruct the judiciary to protect 
in addition to 
provisions of the Cons 
individual rights, not tate s "(Harvard Law Review, 
1980:1182) 
A. INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 
This movement from group and fami interests to individual 
individual interests s not new cultural (Maine, 1917:99) 
but its 
mid-1970s with 
cultural and 1 
consider the caveat 
ant to distinguish 
and 
from the interest 
ins tutions."(l91 
AB 525 either doe 
attempts to elevate 
rights" above the 
This 
toward 






ion law is as new as the 
Ei , (1972) These 
s demand that the proponents of AB 525 
Pound, "It is import-
interests domestic relations 
as social 
if it does 
family-based 
due process and privacy. 
freedom for women flows 
ly enjoyed by 
of both marital partners 
,of course is "implicated 










Fortunately, it is not only scholars who share the previously 
mentioned view of privacy, due process, tradition and personhood 
bu! t hf' !J. s. Court as well. In v. Household 
Finance Corp, (1972) the Court narrowed the distinction between the 
protection of and c activit s. This decision 
and the subsequent is of of great importance to those 
spouses whose earning capacity 
would then be directed by the 
increases during marriage and who 
slature and judiciary to pay 
property dollars to their post dissolution and thus 
former spouses. (In re Marriage of Fortier, 1973; CC§ 5118) 
Justice Stewart explains that the concept of personal rights 
means also: 
In Al 
" ... the right to enjoy property without unlawful 
deprivation, no less than the right to speak 
or the right to travel, ... [a] fundamental 
interdependence exists between the personal right 
to liberty and the person in property ... 
[n]either could have meaning without the other 
(Lynch,: 552) 
r v. Loui iana the Court found: 
"The 1 mentioned [in the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment] means not only the 
right of the izen to be free from the mere 
phys res of his person, but ... to embrace 
the ... to be free in the enjoyment of all his 
facul to be free to use them in all lawful 
ways;... earn his livel1hood by any lawful 
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation ... 
(1987:589) (emphasis added) 
Truax v. Raich, (1915) concurs: 
the common 
is of the very 
essence of freedom and opportunity 
that was the purpose of the Amendment[XIV] 
to secure. :41) 
For those who would trounce the traditions of liberty Justice 








and is ranked 





of inc sed 
f 1 s 
reach the con-
for the i reas 
The main cause and effect levels are five: 
(1) Monetary support provides sustenance. 
(2) Sustenance may provide freedom from labor market participa-
tion. 
(3) Freedom from labor market participation produces time in 
which to pursue a great many other activities, including 
education. 
(4) Education provides the potential for an occupation. 
(5) An occupation, if pursued, provides income. 
Otis Dudley Duncan, a pioneer in the development of the status 
attainment model, concludes there is, 
" ... a high correlation between the amount of education 
and the size of income of workers in an occupation with 
the NORC (National Opinion Research Center) prestige 
rating of them and that income and education and occupa-
tion are functionally related. This means that education 
is a cause of occupation while income is an effect of 
occupat1on," (Duncan in Reiss, et al., (1961:116-117) 
as quoted in Sokoloff, (1980:22) 
Income, of course, has the fundamental value for dissolution 
purposes. Even proponents of the "human capital investment" 
theory concede the indirectness involved in measuring the 
"return on investment through education." Krauskopf acknow-
ledges: 
"Much recent economic research has been devoted to 
methods of quantifying or measuring the value of an 
education .... A person' skills and knowledge constitute 
his capacity to produce goods and services, but because 
no market exist for selling and buying human capacity 
as exists for land or machinery, the value of human 
capital must be measured indirectly through the income 
or earnings that a person will be paid for his capacity 
to produce." (1980:382) 
This means that only after the income is produced can one 
attempt to correlate the value of the education and the 






and treatises written 





of the U.S. 
arbitrari 







" ... [t]he right to study any particular subject or 
any foreign language [is not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion nor in the 11 of ] ... Yet the First 
Amendment has been construed to include certain of 
those rights (1965:482) ... In other words, the State 
may not, cons with the of the First 
Amendment, contract available knowledge. 
The right of freedom of and press includes ... 
the right to , the right to read (Martin v. 
Struthers,l943), and freedom of inquiry, freedom of 
thought ... --indeed the freedom of the entire university 
community. ( omitted) 
D. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND PEONAGE 
Finally, AB 525 would an invididual's personal 
rights and offend the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution by 
servitude in most 
automatic status of involuntary 
marriages. 
In marriages where the husband is the breadwinner, an achiever 
and for tance, an execut and the wife is a homemaker, any 
increase in the husband's earning capacity would add to an 
overwhelming personal for the husband and a longterm 
annuity for the based s on the idence of marriage. 
This is parti offens when one realizes the homemake~ 
wife already accrues 50 st the community 
property. For a student spouse a sional field the 
debt would be even 
v. Alabama, (1911:240-241) 
and longt.erm. In Bailey 
rteenth Amendment is clarified: 
"While the concern was African slavery, 
to that .... The words amendment not 1 
involuntary servitude have a ' 
slavery' ... The 
of whatever name and form and 
incidents; to render 





was to abolish slavery 
all its badges and 
any state of bondage; 




Redhail introduced and established two central which 
are critical to States and marital statutes. 
They are, f t, the to marry as a fundamental and 
thus protected 
States' enacting statutes 
decision to enter First the cases leading to 
Redhail. 
A. MOVING TOWARD THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
The 1887 case 
dis so 
an Oregon Territory case 
characterized marriage as 
"the most important relation life." (:205) v. Nebraska, 
a Nebraska law wh forbade the teaching of any language 
other than English to a child under grade held "the 
right 'to marry' as central of the 1 protected by 
the Due Process Clause." (192 :399) 
In 1942, the Court heard Skinner v. Oklahoma, and struck down 
a statute which 
criminals. The 
were fundamental to 
In 
for the s 
declared that 
zation of habitual 
and procreation 
existence and survival of the 
race. (:541) a, the laws arbitrarily 
----~~------~----









there was a const 
a fundamental liberty protected 
freedom marry. The Court's 
43 
zed as one of 
to the orderly 
men. Marriage is one of the 
fundamental to our very 
at 12, quoting Skinner 
942:541) 
declared the pro-
tructions and advice 
opinion that 
to marital privacy. 
were 
"Since our past decisions make clear that the right to 
marry is of fundamental importance and since the 
classificat at issue here significantly interferes 
with the se of that right, we believe that 'critical 
examination' of the state interests advanced in support 
of the classification in required." (Citations omitted) 
(: 3 8 3) (emphasis added) 
While the Court appeared adamant about the fundamentality of the 
right to marry and heightened scrutiny in the Redhail case 
it is only fair to note that the Redhail decision appeared 
to imply two ideas which were unintended by the Court. 
C. THE OTHER "RIGHT TO MARRY" CASE-- CALIFANO v. JOBST 
The first idea was that the Court was over-reaching in 
its "heightened scrutiny" of state ~egulations regard-
ing marriage. The Court had long held and continued to hold 
that the regulation of marriage was by and large still under 
the authority and judgment o the States .. Justice Marshall 
offered this disclaimer: 
"By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right 
to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state 
regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of 
or prerequis for marriage must be subjected to 
rigorous scrut To the contrary, reasonable regula-
tions that do not s fi interfere with decisions 
'rhe second was that the Court was istent in its 




ier that Term, Califano v. Jobst. Jobst involved the pro-
of the Social Act specifying that secondary 
ts by a disabled dependent child of a covered 
earner would when the child married an individual 
who was not entitled to ts under the Act. The Court 
rationalized in Jobst that one, marriage was an event which 
usually changed economic status, and more often than not the 
included the val 
less likely to be 
assumption "that a married person is 
on his parents for support than 
who is unmarried." (:53) 
45 
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be absolute " 




Just as Boddie v. Connecticut was held unconstitutional because 
the statute denied indigents access to the courts to obt~in 
a divorce because of fees and costs, so too does the statute in 
Redhail directly deny indigents unable to meet child support 
payments a marriage license, (not withstanding the fee of the 
marriage license) . 
More to the second point and AB 525 is the Court's distinction 
of the second type of financial burden and its effect on inter-
fering with the right to marry. This distinction goes to the 
heart of the issue of s 
write: 
ficance and substantial They 
"Many others, able in theory to satisfy the statute's 
requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having 
to do so that they w1ll 1n effect be coerced 1nto for-
going their right to marry. And even those who can be 
persuaded to meet the statute's requirements suffer a 
serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an 
area in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental." 
{:374) (emphasis added) 
The distinction between and substantial or significant 
interference with the right to marry is of course an issue with 
AB 525 and similar legislation. The opinion held in this state-
ment is that substantiality and significance should not be 
inferred from directness nor insubstantiality and insignificance 
from indirectness. The impact of the inferences has perhaps 
never been better expressed than in the following paragraph from 
the Harvard Law Review: 
"The result [of the ], of course, is to reduce 
the test to one of directness. But emphasizing direct-
ness to the exclusion of significance creates a danger 
that the protection of the right to marry will become 
illusory; only direct interferences will be scrutinized, 
even though in most cases, the State can achieve a 
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The public interest, especially for women, rests upon the pro-
motion and protection of individual rights. 
What will be different is that women, more and more, will be 
asked and expected to bear more responsibility for their own 
futures and lives. This freedom, responsibility and individual 
rights doctrine will also force us as a country and a state 
to begin to make critical decisions about the type of future 
we want vis-a-vis families, parents and children. In making 
these decisions we will no longer be able to take for granted 
and collectively benefit from women's free labor and then pass 
off the responsibility for this extraction of women's labor and 
resources to husbands. 
In the short run, this shift in responsibility will be expensive, 
difficult and challenge the status quo in both the nation and 
the State. But in the long run, the shift will prove not only 
to be beneficial to the nation and the State but necessary to 
preserve it. We have a tremendous stake in the family whether 
that family is viewed as a collective or as an "association 
of two individuals." (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972:453) 
We "rely to a considerable extent on the family not only to 
nurture the young but also to instill the habits required by 
citizenship in a self-governing community. We have relied 
on the family to teach us to care for others [and] to moderate 
... self-interest .... " (Berns, 1976:222) We have further relied 
on the fami for "[t]he basic process of cultural transmission, 
without which the traditions and fundamental values of the 
society are not passed on ... " (Hafen, 1983:478) Our stake is 
that families provide "a princ source of moral and civic 
duty." (Hafen, 1983:477) 
women's equal and the respect for individual rights 
we as a nation and a State and a soc will be forced to put 
our money where we have mouthed saccharine sentiments about the 
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APPENDIX C 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSUMBLY JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE CONCERNING ASSEMBLY BILL 525 
November 16, 1983 
My name is Ted Cranston. I am an attorney, and I have 
practiced in the area of estate planning, trust and probate law 
for the past 20 years. I am a member of the Executive 
Committee of the State Bar Estate Planning, Trust and Probate 
Law Section, and I am here today as their representative. 
As you know, our section is opposed to Assembly 
Bill 525 as it has been proposed~ however, the message I want 
to deliver today is more than that. We recognize the injustice 
a dissolution inflicts on a person who worked to help his or 
her spouse obtain a degree which enhanced earning capacity. 
Often the working spouse also sacrifices his or her own 
education. When a divorce ensues, the working spouse's 
inability to thereafter receive the rewards of the enhanced 
earning capacity constitutes a demonstrable inequity. 
It is our belief that the problem is best resolved in 
the dissolution process through the award of increased spousal 
support (in amount or duration) or through reimbursement (of 
the amount contributed to the education process or the cost of 
a comparable education). Making the increased earning capacity 
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Bill 525 provides that 
e to earning capacity 
This property 
of the marriage." We 
all ze that th s egislation has been dra in 
response to the llivan case, ch is a dissolution 
ing. Marriages however also nate upon the death 
o a spouse, and ther is nothing i AB 525 which would 
restr ct its 
fact, one mi t 
created, could be 
icat 
issolution and not 
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t on situation. 
property asset, once 
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y in the context of a 
uably such a situation now 
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f rs as either in 






es of the problems 
ng 
sset 
a wife has the 
property asset 
husband is 
death, can will her 
ird pa Pre 
e met the beneficiary 
titled t part cipate in the 
1 0 
earnings of the surviving husband following the wife's death. 
If the wife left her estate to one other than the husband, the 
husband would be working for others from there on. 
2. Assume the case where a dissolution has taken 
place and a former wife has been awarded her share of the 
"earning capacity" asset. Presumably, that asset is subject to 
disposition by her in the same way as any other asset. Thus, 
she could, by her will, leave this interest to her second 
husband. Following her death, her second husband would have 
the right to participate in the earnings of the first husband 
so long as the first husband continued to work. Needless to 
say, this approach creates inequities of its own in an effort 
to solve an injustice about which most people would agree. One 
wonders, in this example, how long and how enthusiastically the 
first husband might work under the circumstances. Given the 
number of divorces that occur, the effect upon the working 
population might be devastating over a period of time. 
3. Assume again that a dissolution has taken place 
and that the wife has received her share of the "earning 
capacity" asset. Why is she not free to sell this asset as she 
might sell any other asset, thus converting the right to 
receive funds over a period of time to a present lump sum? 
Then her husband would have a third party partner for the 
balance of his career. 
-3-
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Focusing agai on the case where the wife has a 
community proper interest in the earning capacity of the 
husband, upon her death as e t she wills her interest in 
her husband s ea apa a beneficiary other than the 
husband. If large i valu ich could easily be the 
case) taxes may be due within nine months of the date of death 
even throu the funds from the husband 1 s earnings may not be 
r eived for years Th impo a severe hardship on the 
i iv 1 respon ibl for the 
5. Final n def n property right, 
ly no accoun s taken r ence that may be 
ga ned w 11 after the marri inated. The calculation 
of the earn i ake account the period of 
i rr with a reduct 
set of the marr 
most o i i realized based not 
e Wh le our Section does 
ri is the 
0 y any definition of a 
e into account all 
ence e nat of the 
r ag 
e s s now on appeal before 
t for eve that the legislature 
I /83 1s 
should await the Supreme Court's decision in that matter before 
acting. 
The Law Revision Commission is now drafting a statute 
designed to reimburse the working spouse for the effort 
expended to educate the non-working spouse. This statute 
follows the suggestions of the concurring opinion in the 
Sullivan case. We believe that this, and other potential 
solutions not involving a property right concept, deserve 
attention to rectify the injustice that now exists. 
While we oppose the property right concept of AB 525 
because of the inequities we believe it would create, we would 
be happy to provide estate planning imput concerning other 
suggestions which are put forth to help achieve a solution to 
this problem. We would be pleased to assist in any way that we 
can and to work with you, the Family Law Section and others to 
come up with a feasible and workable recommendation. 
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b 1 can be sta 
r of our Family Law 
e 
we consi r this bill to be 
befall the i law arena 
1 fo ni family Law Acl 
1 practice to the United 
ous disservice to the 
Mr. Jim Ellis 
Ms. Sunny Monjonnier 
Mr. Larry Stirling 
oqtober 21, 1983 
2. The bill prolongs ties between parties. 
Page 2 
3. It will require a new industry of "experts" who will be 
testify as to the "percentage of increased qualifications." 
4. The cost in attorney fees to the already beleaguered 
litigants will be enormous. 
5. The court system will be enormously stretched in order 
to try these issues since they will add a substantial new 
issue to virtually every case. 
6. ~Lawyers, because of their legitimate malpractice 
concerns will be required to "take their best shot" at 
obtaining such value in the courtroom. (Ref: Smith y. 
Le~is) 
7. The appellate prQcess will, of course, have to be 
increased to handle the myriad interpretations that will 
naturally flow from inventive lawyers properly representing 
their clients. 
In other words, the bill is a disservice to the law, to the 
lawyers, to the courts, to the appellate process, but most 
of all, to the people themselves and the points raised above 
are merely prQcedural problems. 
On balance, there is no wide-spread evil either real or 
perceived that needs a cure. You are using a bazooka to 
kill a gnat. The evil perceived is that on occasion a 
doctor or lawyer obtains an education at the expense of 
his/her spouse. The bill opens up all of self-improvement 
during_the marriage to judicial review and evaluation. 
All cases must be presented through the testimony of 
competent and qualified witnesses. What sort of monster 
will this create? We will have to present educational or 
vocational experts in order to affix percentages and to 
testify as to the enhancements in qualifications. 
Both sides will be required to have experts, not only to 
rebut other's expert but to testify about their own 
qualifications. 
After fixing value, an accounting will be required to 
subtract and make demand for the so-called separate property 
contribution by the person being educated. 
Mr. 
O~t 
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situa on: 
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2. I man:i 
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l set forth in AB 525, re are 
assets upon marriage 






practice during marriage as longing to that 
person and not as co~~uni property. [See Todd v Todd, 
272 Cal.App.2d 786 1969); In reMarriage of-xufmut~9 
Cal.App.3d 446 (1979); Graham v Graham, Col.Sup.Ct., 574 
P.2d 75 1978). 
Provide 
spouse's educat 
agreement to the 
include the part 
agreement. 
Treat a 's 
practice as his 
ty property funds spent on a 
are a gi to community absent an 
contrary. This alternative would 
s' ability to execute a prenuptial 
, degree, and license to 
property in which the community 
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for unjust enrichment and 
with the trial for dissolution. 
~~~~~ Ok .Sup.Ct., 603 P.2d 747, 
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its value in current 
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i Superior Court, 
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to practice 
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re is 1 
a money 
not limited to 
made only for 
tuition, books, 
the other spouse. 
31-1-11.5-11 (c) 
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However, award may be 
of one spouse toward 
the education of 
Indiana Code Section 
In Wisconsin, the court, 
property, must consider " 
dividing part s' marital 
contribution by one party to the 
education, train or earning power of the other." 
[Wisconsin Statutes Annotated 767.255) 
* * * * * * 
To facilitate the discussion at the hearing, witnesses have been 
asked to address the following questions: 
1 
-'" . Should career assets be 
purposes of sso 
"property" for 
? 
2. What should be includable as a career asset? 
3. What method should for a monetary 
valuation of career assets? 
4. 
5. 
Should career assets 
property 
dissolution 
What manner of d 
appropr ate? 
as community 
subject to division upon 
? 
career assets would be 
6. What s, f any, shou made in the division 
of career assets? 
7. 
8 . What 
slature 
If you would l more in 
contact me at (916) 445-4560. 
ld be examined? 
discussed before the 
to career assets? 
t ring, please 
EXHIBIT B 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE--1983-84 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY No. 525 
Introduced by McAlister, Hughes, Agnos, 
Alatorre, Allen, Bane, Bergeson, Davis, Hayden 
La Follette, ~fojonnier, Molina, Moore, Stirling, Tanner, 
Maxine Waters, and Wright 
Doolittle, Leroy Greene, Johnson, 
'-AV'"-"'''-'• Robbins, Speraw, and Stiern) 
February 
,An act to Section 5118 of, and add Section 5117 to, 
the Civil Code, relating community property. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
Community property. 




property, except as 
percentage of a person's 
his or her employment 
his or earning capacity 
of termination of h1~<> 
solely to his or her 
marriage is 
only Jf person 
one-half the current ~'<due 
contributed during the 
or her earning cap;Jcity. The 
a n1arriage vvherein no 
AB 525 -2-
children were either adopted or conceived by the husband 
and wife and born alive during or ufter the marriage. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do em1ct as follmn: 
1 SECTION l. Section 5117 is added to the Civil Code. 
2 to read: 
3 5117. (a) The percentage of a person's present and 
4 future earnings from his or her employment that is equal 
5 to the percentage of his or her earning capacity .,., hieh 
6 was acquired dttring at the of terrmiwtion of his or 
7 her marriage, which not attributable solel_v to his or her 
8 qualifications existing at the outset of the marriage is 
9 community property. 
10 (b) ror the purpose of this section, the person s 
by that percentage of the 
uttributable to community 
11 earning capacity is 
12 earning cap::~.city 
13 property from <l 
14 (c) This 
15 reimbursed 
16 value of his or 
17 during the 
18 earning capacity. 
19 belongs to the 
20 (d) The 






spouse :1gree on 
delivered. 
26 (e) 
only if the person is 
uu'"'''-' for one-hnlf the eurren t 
property which contributed 
to the attainment of his or her 
option for such reimbursement 
s spouse. 
viJ\./UL .... • may choose whether or not to 
section discharged in a manner 
his or portion of the 
person t:md Jn:'i or her 
m:mner and on the amount to be 
27 discharged i11 <1 manner 
scc[jon h£1s been 
to delivery of the 
28 pertinent 
29 spouse has a 
30 present and 
as the person :~· 
a nwrit:.d lien, on the person :., 
31 (I) This section not applicable to <l murriage wherein 
32 no children were either adopted or conceived b)· 
33 husbund tmd wlfe and born alive during or :zfter the 
-163-
91l llO 
'-3- AB 525 
1 marri<lge. 
2 SEC Section 5118 Civil Code is amended to 
3 ret.zd: 
4 5118. Except as provided in Section 5117, the 
5 earnings accumulations of a spouse and the minor 
6 living with, o:r in the custody of, the spouse, 
7 separate and apart from the other spouse, are 




ASSEMBLY BILL No. 525 
Introduced by Assemblymen McAlister, Hughes, Agnos, 
Alatorre, Allen, Bane, Bates, Bergeson, Davis, Hayden 
La Follette, Mojonnier, Molina, Moore, Stirling, Tanner, 
Maxine \Vaters, and Wright 
(Coauthors: Senators Doolittle, Leroy Greene, Johnson, 
McCorquodale, Robbins, Speraw, and Stiern) 
February 8, 1983 
An act to add Section '51 to the Civil Code, relating to 
community property. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL"S DIGEST 
Community property. 
that all real property 
situated personal property, wherever 
situated, acquired during marriage by a married person while 
domiciled in this state property, except as 
specified. 
This bill specify that the percentage of a person's 
present and future which is equal to the percentage 
of his or her capacity which was acquired during the 
marriage is 
Vote: majority. no. committee: no. 
State-mandated 
The people enact ;ls follows: 
l SECTION l. 17 is to the Civil Code, 
2 to read: 
3 5117. of a person's present and future 
4 earnings to the percentage of his or her 
5 earning capacity which was acquired during the 
-165- 99 40 
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is 
166- 99 40 
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attributable to his 







or legal separat 




Recent case law ho that a 





's earnings and 
are their community 
property. Upon dissolution 
with certain exceptions, 
assets and liabilities 
fessional education acquired 
is neither community nor separate 
the attributes of property. In property since it does not 
re Marriage of Sullivan, 13 
granted October 28, 1982. 
Cal.App.3d 634 (1982), hearing 
This bill wou 










The provisions of is 
the person's spouse re 
tant L. 
11/16/83 
of a person's present 
which is equal to the 
sting at the time when the 
property. However, earnings 
is attributable solely to the 
at outset of the marriage 
67-
a "marital lien" on a 
in favor of the person's 
to the lien 
that there is an 
delivered. 
would be reduced by the 
to community property 
be applicable only if 























s ruling in 
3. This bill is premi on capac during 
4. 
marriage. The author claims that the real issue in cases 
such as Sullivan is the f husband's earning 
capacity, rather than the value of an education, degree, or 
license to practice. A comparison is made to the concept of 
good will in a business or professional practice. For many 
years, the California courts have recognized that the marital 
community may have a property interest in the good will of a 
professional practice that has been built up during the 
marriage. (There are no fixed rules for determining the 
value of good will. Some courts look at estimates of market 
value, multiple or excess earnings, a percentage of one 
year's income, and testimony of expert witnesses. Other 
courts enumerate a number of to be considered.) The 
author argues that there is no good reason for giving 
different legal treatment to a spouse's enhanced earning 
capacity mere because most or even all of that professional 
practice lies in the future. 




s 11, II capacity" be 
1 education 
property because it 
property. However, the 
s broadly defined to be 
or exchangab value. For 
are " " include 
ERISA rement benefits, 
term life insurance benefits. 
to practice a 
right. 
In opposit to s bill, Estate Planning, 
Trust and Probate Law Sect "[e]arning 
capacity is an amorphous le to valuation 
and inappropriate for treatment as property." Others believe 
that a professional , degree and license are merely 
an "educational the direct result of 
a person's " lity." 
Should a "career asset" be as property? Is earning 
capacity actually comparable to good will or other intangible 
(CONTINUED) 




























does not work at all, would the marital lien be cancelled? 
How long would the marital lien last? Does this bill 
represent a form of indentured servitude? Would this bill 
work against the social policy of encouraging people to 
realize their earning capacity? 
9. This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(b} would 
require that a person's earning capacity be reduced by the 
percentage of earning capacity attributable to community 
property from a prior marriage. Is this provision intended 
to specify that community property from a previous marriage 
would be treated the same as "qualifications existing at the 
outset of the marriage"? If so, subdivision {b) should be 
redrafted for clarity. 
10. This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(c) would 
require that, if a person's separate property had been used 
to attain his earning capacity, the person's spouse would 
have to reimburse him for "one-half of the current value" of 
that separate property. The option for reimbursement would 
rest with the person's spouse. Presumably, "current value" 
would include inflation and the increased costs of attaining 
the enhanced earning capacity. Is the reimbursement intended 
to be a strict prerequisite before the marital lien would be 
applicable? If the person's spouse is unable to reimburse 
him in cash, should there be an opportunity for an offset 
against the interest in his enhanced earning capacity? 
11. This bill in proposed Civil Code Section 5117(d) would 
provide that the marital lien may be discharged in a manner 
alternative to that which is set forth in the bill when the 
obligor and the obligee agree as to the manner and amount to 
be delivered. Should the bill take a more flexible approach 
by instead authorizing the court to decide whether an 
alternative manner and amount would be warranted under the 
circumstances of the case? 
12. The stated purpose of the bill is to address marriages in 
ch there is little or no tangible community property upon 
dissolution. However, the bill could be applied to long-term 
marriages in vThich the spouses accumulated a considerable 
amount of community property as a result of the earning 
ability. Should the court be given discretion to apply the 
principle of enhanced earning capacity on a case by case 
basis? 
13. The bill would apply to enhanced earning capacity, however 
minimal, if it was acquired during the marriage. Should the 
bill require a showing of "substantial" enhancement? Would 
this bill lead to prolonged trials over the existence, value, 
and any appropriate division of a "career asset"? Would the 
testimony of expert witnesses be essential? 
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This recommendation includes an explanatory Comment 
to each section recommended legislation. The 
Comments are written as if the legislation were enacted 
since their purpose is to explain the law as it would 
exist (if enacted) to those who will have occasion to use it 
after it is in effect. 
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Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
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EXHIBIT I 
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Nov. 12, 1983 
3 
My own analysis of the s that would a 
property division and roy discussion of the that support 
in making awards areset forth in the enclosed 
my article, "The Definition and Division of Marital Property in 
fornia: Towards 
810-21, 853-55 (1982). 
Instead, let me summarize the features 
tive that I would most recommend: 
( 
(2) 
The relief would be denominated lump sum 
forth in a code section separate from either 
or §4801 (traditional ). 
des rel would 
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